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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the summer of 2003, the debate over same-sex “marriage” 
captured the attention of the American public to an extent heretofore 
unseen. In 1996, the Hawaii Supreme Court appeared to be on the verge 
of redefining marriage in Hawaii,1 yet few people outside of Hawaii paid 
close attention. In 1999, the Vermont Supreme Court demanded that the 
Legislature extend marriage-like recognition to same-sex couples,2 and 
for the most part, only those in Vermont took notice. Two years later the 
Dutch Parliament “opened up” marriage to include same-sex couples,3 
though the first officially sanctioned same-sex “marriage” in recorded 
history came and went with little fanfare in the United States. It wasn’t 
until the summer of ‘03 that a major triad of marriage-related 
developments struck close to home, converging to push same-sex 
“marriage” to the forefront of American political and social life. The 
media firestorm kicked off on June 26, 2003, when the United States 
Supreme Court struck down a Texas law banning homosexual sodomy.4 
While Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion and Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence both went out of their way to disclaim any direct impact on 
marriage litigation,5 the potential implications were only thinly veiled. 
As Justice Scalia bluntly criticized in his dissenting opinion, “Today’s 
opinion dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a 
distinction to be made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, 
insofar as formal recognition in marriage is concerned.”6 Numerous 
commentators quickly joined the chorus, alternatively deriding and 
celebrating the majority opinion as having paved the way for same-sex 
“marriage” in the United States.7 
 
 1. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394 (Haw. Cir. 
Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). 
 2. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 3. Stb. 2001, No. 9 (“Act on the Opening Up of Marriage”) (Bill 22672) (Dec. 21, 2000). 
 4. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003). 
 5. Id. at 2484 (“The present case . . . does not involve whether the government must give 
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”); Id. at 2488 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations— the asserted state 
interest in this case— other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere moral 
disapproval of an excluded group.”). 
 6. Id. at 2498. 
 7. See, e.g., Ellen Goodman, Next Step for Homosexuals Will Be Down the Aisle, 
BALTIMORE SUN, June 30, 2003, at 9A; Michael Kinsley, Abolish Marriage; Let’s Really Get the 
Government Out of Our Bedrooms, WASHINGTON POST, July 3, 2003, at A23; Gegax, Rosenberg, et 
al., The War Over Gay Marriage, NEWSWEEK, July 7, 2003, at 38; Rick Santorum, Gay Unions: A 
Matter of Rights or a Threat to Traditional Marriage? Americans Must Preserve Institution of 
Marriage, USA TODAY, July 10, 2003, at A13; David G. Savage, High Court Ruling May Lead to 
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The Lawrence decision landed upon a media market ripe for 
discussion of marriage issues. Just two weeks earlier, the Ontario Court 
of Appeals had found the Canadian marriage law in constitutional 
violation and had ordered the Toronto clerk’s office to immediately 
begin issuing marriage licenses to applicant same-sex couples.8 Even 
closer to home, a decision in the case of seven same-sex couples seeking 
marriage licenses in Massachusetts, then pending before the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, was expected at any time.9 This 
trilogy of events, actual and anticipated, sparked an unprecedented 
degree of media attention devoted to the marriage debate.10 
More than a year before the election, same-sex “marriage” and civil 
unions had already become a topic of conversation surrounding the 2004 
presidential campaign.11 The presidential campaign of former Vermont 
Governor Howard Dean quickly made same-sex unions a prime political 
question, with all of the Democratic Party primary candidates endorsing 
some form of legal recognition for same-sex unions,12 even as polling 
data shows a majority of the general public opposed to both same-sex 
 
Gay Marriage Rights; Both Sides Agree it Follows Logically, DAILY PRESS (Va.), June 28, 2003, at 
A1. 
 8. Halpern v. Toronto [2003] C.A. 2159. 
 9. Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 14 Mass. L. Rep. 591 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002), 
vacated by Goodridge v. Dept. of Publ. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 10. Cheryl Wetzstein, Gay ‘marriages’ ahead: Debate Stirs in the States, WASHINGTON 
TIMES, July 13, 2003, at A1 (“For years, the issue of same-sex ‘marriage’ in America has surfaced 
only occasionally, a topic of arcane conversation, and promptly slips away. No longer. High court 
decisions in Canada and the United States and a pending lawsuit in Massachusetts will finally force 
‘gay marriage’ to the top of the nation’s legal and cultural agenda.”). A rough statistical analysis of 
the primarily print media sources contained in the Westlaw database finds more news articles 
dealing with same-sex “marriage” this summer than in any month in the previous seven years. A 
search of the Westlaw news database for the month of June 2003 revealed 1353 articles mentioning 
the phrase “same-sex marriage.” In July and August, there were 1243 and 1688 articles, respectively. 
The previous monthly high of 832 articles was reached in September 1996, as Congress adopted the 
Defense of Marriage Act and a Hawaii court considered evidence in Baehr v. Miike. Most months 
have seen between one and two hundred articles containing the phrase “same-sex marriage.” The 
Baker v. State decision that gave rise to Vermont civil unions produced 255 articles in December 
1999, and the effective date of the Dutch same-sex “marriage” legislation in April 2001 produced 
just 126 articles in the Westlaw database. 
 11. See, e.g., Maggie Gallagher, Concerns Boil Down to Three Big Issues, MYRTLE BEACH 
SUN-NEWS, Aug. 21, 2003, at 9 (suggesting that terrorism, the energy crisis, and gay marriage will 
be the three big topics of the 2004 election season); Will Lester, Most in Poll Favor Gay-Marriage 
Ban – Many Say They’ll Oppose ‘04 Candidates Who Defend Same-Sex Unions, NEWARK STAR-
LEDGER, Aug. 19, 2003, at 4; Dick Morris, W’s Weapon Against Dean, NEW YORK POST, Nov. 5, 
2003 (“In a Bush-Dean race, the contest would likely hinge on three semantic differences. The way 
the electorate defines the gay marriage, tax-cut and Iraq issues will spell victory or defeat for the 
candidates.”). 
 12. Mary Leonard, GOP Sees ‘04 Issue in Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 7, 2003, at 
A1 (“None of the leading Democratic candidates support gay marriage, but all are wooing gay and 
lesbian activists and young voters with promises to fight a constitutional amendment, endorse civil 
unions, and expand domestic benefits to same-sex couples.”). 
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“marriage” and civil unions.13 A proposed marriage amendment to the 
United States Constitution gained fifty co-sponsors during the month of 
July alone, tripling its previous support.14 Polling data from throughout 
the summer and fall of 2003 suggests that many Americans are still in 
the process of forming, reforming, and solidifying opinions on same-sex 
“marriage” and “civil unions.”15 
As a nation, we have come face to face with the difficult questions 
surrounding the definition of that social institution called marriage. As 
many Americans now consider these issues for the first time, it strikes 
me that a concise overview of the debate as it stands today, with some 
reference to the history which has brought us to this point, may be 
helpful to many.16 That concise overview is essentially what I have 
undertaken to provide in this article, recognizing already that I will likely 
fail on both counts. First, this overview will be longer than I would have 
liked it to be, sacrificing brevity. Secondly, it will be shorter than it needs 
to be, sacrificing breadth and detail. I trust the compromise will prove 
somewhat satisfactory to the reader. 
II. CURRENT CONTROVERSIES IN THE MARRIAGE DEBATE 
To date, the marriage debate has largely been a counterpoint of 
judicial action and legislative reaction. Since same-sex couples first 
began to seek marriage licenses in the early 1970’s, courts have been 
repeatedly called upon to interpret state marriage laws and evaluate their 
constitutionality. In response to real or anticipated threats from the 
courts, state legislatures have often adopted measures intended to 
mitigate the likelihood of a judicial redefinition of marriage.17 In the 
1990’s, this counterpoint saw marriage litigation in Hawaii, quickly 
followed by the adoption of the first state marriage recognition (state 
DOMA) bill in 199418 and the federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) 
 
 13. Alan Cooperman, Sodomy Ruling Fuels Battle Over Gay Marriage, WASHINGTON POST, 
July 31, 2003, at A1 (“In an unexpected shift in the electoral landscape, polls show that public 
support of gay rights in general, and of ‘civil unions’ for same- sex couples in particular, has fallen 
about 10 percentage points since the court’s June 26 ruling.”). 
 14. H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003). As of June 25, the measure had attracted 25 
cosponsors. In the weeks following the Lawrence v. Texas decision, that number jumped to 75 
cosponsors. As of November 1, 2003, the total stands at 96. 
 15. See, e.g., Associated Press, Polls Hint at Backlash After Gay-Rights Ruling, CHICAGO 
TRIBUNE, July 30, 2003, at 10. 
 16. Except as otherwise noted, the discussion contained in this article attempts to incorporate 
developments occurring through February 2004. 
 17. See David O. Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Definition or Discrimination: State 
Marriage Recognition Statutes in the “Same-Sex Marriage” Debate, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 3, 5 
(1998). 
 18. 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217. 
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in 1996.19 Today, 38 states have adopted marriage recognition statutes 
defining marriage as a male-female union and declining to recognize 
same-sex unions as marriages.20 In Alaska, a trial court opinion striking 
down the state marriage statute prompted almost immediate legislative 
response, resulting in the ratification of a marriage amendment to the 
state constitution just eight months later.21 In Vermont, the court gave the 
legislature instructions to guide its creation of civil unions.22 Recently, 
the Massachusetts legislature weighed its response to the Supreme 
Judicial Court’s recent decision in Goodridge v. Department of Public 
Health.23 
While encompassing a wide variety of factual situations and political 
realities, today’s marriage debate encompasses three subcategories of 
disputes, each with distinct legal and social ramifications: (1) same-sex 
marriage controversies, (2) disputes over marital benefits, and (3) 
questions of interstate marriage recognition. While the definition of 
marriage remains at the heart of the marriage debate both politically and 
philosophically, recent litigation has emphasized marital benefits and 
recognition, opening up three major fronts in the marriage debate. 
 
 19. Pub. L. 104-199, 100 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. §1738C 
(1997)). 
 20. ALA. CODE § 30-1-19 (2002); ALA. CONST. art. I, § 25; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101 
(West 2000); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-107 (Michie 2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109 (Michie 
2002); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208 (Michie 2002); CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (West 2002); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (2001); FLA STAT. ANN. § 741.212 
(West 2000); GA. CODE ANN. 19-3-3.1 (2002); HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-3 (1999); HAW. CONST. art. 
1, § 23; IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (Michie 2002); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212 (West 2000); IND. 
CODE § 31-11- 1-1 (2002); IOWA. CODE. § 595.2 (2002); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (1999); KY. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 402.040, 404.045 (Michie 2002); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 89 (West 2000), 
amended by 1999 La. Acts 890 §1; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701 (West 2002); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 551.1 (West 2000); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.271 (West 2000); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 517.01 (West 2004); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-1-1 (2003); MO. REV. STAT. § 451.022 (West 
2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401 (2002); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; Nev. Question 2 (approved 
Nov. 5, 2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-01 (1960); 2004 Ohio 
Laws 61; OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 43 § 3.1 (West 2000); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 2000); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Law. Co-op 2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie 2000); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-42 (2000); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 
(2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.2 (Michie 2000); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.020 (West 
2000); W.VA. CODE § 48-2-603 (2002). 
 21. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. 
Ct. Feb. 27, 1998); ALASKA. CONST. art. I, § 25. 
 22. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999). 
 23. Goodridge v. Dept. of Publ. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
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A. Same-Sex Marriage Controversies 
1. Overview 
In the United States, all 50 states and the District of Columbia 
recognize marriage as the union of one man and one woman. Forty-two 
states have explicitly enshrined this definition of marriage in their 
statutory system.24 In the remaining eight states and the District of 
Columbia, the definition of marriage is implicit from gender-specific 
references such as “husband” and “wife,” or prohibitions on certain 
incestuous relationships that presume a male-female definition of 
marriage,25 and courts considering the marriage laws of these states have 
uniformly found the existing marriage statute to contemplate only 
opposite-sex couples.26 
 
 24. ALA. CODE § 30-1-19; ALA. CONST. art. I, § 25; ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101; ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 9-11-107; ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-109; ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-208; CAL. FAM. 
CODE § 308.5; COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101; FLA STAT. ANN. § 
741.212; GA. CODE ANN. 19-3-3.1; HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-3; HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23; IDAHO 
CODE § 32-209; 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/212; IND. CODE § 31-11- 1-1; IOWA CODE 595.2; 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101; KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 402.040, 404.045; LA. CIV. C. art. 89; MD. 
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-201 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A, § 701; MICH. COMP. LAWS 
ANN. § 551.1; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.271; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 517.01; MISS. CODE ANN. § 
93-1-1; MO. REV. STAT. § 451.022; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401; NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29; NEV. 
CONST. art. 1, § 21 (2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-1.2; N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-01; N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 457:1, 457: 2, 457:43 (2003); 2004 Ohio Laws 61; OKLA. ST. ANN. tit. 43 § 3.1; PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704; S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1; TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 36-3-113; TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.001(B), 6.204 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. §  30-1-4; VT. 
STAT. tit. 15, § 1201(4); VA. CODE §  20-45.2; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.020; W.VA. CODE § 
48-2-603; WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101(2003). 
 25. See, e.g., D.C. CODE. ANN. § 46-401 (2003) (declaring incestuous marriages void ab 
initio as between men and their female relatives and between women and their male relatives); 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-21 (incest provision); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 46a-81r (West 
2003) (declaring that nothing in the prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation should be construed “to authorize . . . the right of marriage between persons of the same 
sex”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 207, §§ 1-2 (1998) (gender-specific prohibition on incestuous 
marriages); N.J. REV. STAT. § 37:1-1 (2003) (gender specific prohibition on incestuous marriages); 
N.J. REV. STAT. § 37:1-3 (2003) (reference to “male party” and “female party” in context of 
marriage license application); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-2-1 (Michie 2003) (referring to marital 
obligations in terms of “husband” and “wife”); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 170 (McKinney 2004) 
(statutory reference to “husband” and “wife” in context of divorce); OR. REV. STAT. § 106.010 
(2003) (marriage entered into by “males” and “females” age 17 or older); OR. REV. STAT. § 106.150 
(2003) (married spouses take each other to be “husband and wife.”); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-1-1, 15-
1-2 (2003) (gender specific prohibitions against incestuous marriages); WIS. STAT. § 765.001 (2003) 
(“marriage is a legal relationship between 2 equal persons, a husband and a wife”). 
 26. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185-86 (Minn. 1971) (decided prior to the 
adoption of Minnesota’s statutory definition of marriage and concluding that the drafters of the 
marriage law used “marriage” according to its common meaning as “the state of union between 
persons of the opposite sex”); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 310 (D.C. 1995) (“The 
language and legislative history of the marriage statute demonstrate that neither Congress nor the 
Council of the District of Columbia has ever intended to define ‘marriage’ to include same-sex 
unions.”); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 868 (Vt. 1999); Goodridge v. Dept. of Publ. Health, 14 
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In 1979, Professor Rhonda Rivera wrote in a Hastings Law Journal 
article that “[a] number of homosexual couples have tried to effectuate a 
legal marriage but to date no court has recognized such a union.”27 The 
same remained true for nearly 25 years, until a ruling of the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court on November 18, 2003 rewrote 
the common law definition of marriage in the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts.28 
Since 1971, there have been direct constitutional challenges to the 
marriage laws of nine states and the District of Columbia that have 
resulted in published opinions.29 Of these ten reported American cases to 
litigate the constitutionality of male-female marriage laws, six simply 
affirmed the marriage laws of the state,30 two (Hawaii and Alaska) were 
preempted by constitutional amendments defining marriage,31 and one 
court (Vermont) stopped short of redefining marriage, but ruled that 
same-sex couples were entitled to marital benefits.32 As of this writing, 
the end result in Massachusetts is still very much in question.33 A number 
 
Mass. L. Rptr. 591, (Mass. Super., May 7, 2002), vacated by, Goodridge v. Dept. of Publ. Health, 
798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); see also Rosengarten v. Downes, 802 A.2d 170 (Conn. App. 2002) 
(finding that Connecticut law does not recognize marriages between persons of the same sex); 
Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 316 (Mass. 1993) (“the laws of the Commonwealth do not 
permit [a same-sex couple] to enter into a legally cognizable marriage”); Rutgers Council of AAUP 
Chapters v. Rutgers Univ., 689 A.2d 828, 835 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (concluding that 
despite the absence of specific statutory reference, New Jersey law “strongly and firmly implied” a 
male-female definition of marriage, such that a contrary legislative intent “cannot be fathomed.”); In 
re Bonfield, 780 N.E.2d 241, 250 (Ohio 2002) (Cook, J., concurring and dissenting) (“[T]he General 
Assembly does not permit same-sex marriages. . .”). 
 27. Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual 
Persons in The United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 874 (1979). 
 28. Goodridge v. Dept. of Publ. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 29. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for lack of substantial 
federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Singer v. 
Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (D.C. Cal. 
1980); Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 
(D.C. 1995); Storrs v. Holcomb, 645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996), appeal dismissed, 666 
N.Y.S.2d 835 (1997); Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 
(Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 30. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for lack of substantial 
federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1972); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Singer v. 
Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974); Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (D.C. Cal. 
1980); Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Storrs v. Holcomb (645 N.Y.S.2d 
286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996), appeal dismissed, 666 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1997). 
 31. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 
Dec. 3, 1996); Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999); HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23 (giving 
legislature authority to define marriage as union of man and woman); Brause v. Bureau of Vital 
Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998); ALASKA. CONST. 
art. I, § 25 (defining marriage as union of man and woman). 
 32. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 33. A constitutional amendment to define marriage as the union of one man and one woman 
was debated in Constitutional Convention in the early part of this year. 2003 Mass. H. 3190. See 
infra, section II.A.4. 
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of additional cases have either been decided on procedural grounds, or 
have been resolved at the trial level and have not produced a published 
opinion.34 Four cases have been filed since 2001, three of which are still 
pending as of this writing.35 
Twelve of these 1336 marriage cases were filed in state courts,37 and 
nine of the 13 cases have been litigated on the basis of state 
constitutional provisions, with Baker v. Nelson,38 Adams v. Howerton,39 
Dean v. District of Columbia,40 and Standhardt v. Superior Court of 
Ariz.41 the four exceptions filing federal claims.42 
In Baker v. Nelson, the first of the published marriage cases, the 
United States Supreme Court ultimately ruled that the Minnesota 
marriage law did not raise any federal constitutional issues, dismissing 
the appeal.43 The Jurisdictional Statement filed in the case alleged that 
 
 34. See, e.g., Burkett v. Zablocki, 54 F.R.D. 626, 626 (E.D. Wis. 1972) (granting clerk’s 
motion to dismiss as plaintiffs failed to respond to the motion); Irwin v. Lupardus, 1980 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 12106 (Ohio Ct. App. June 26, 1980) (rejecting constitutional claims for recognition of a 
same-sex common law marriage). 
 35. Standhardt v. Superior Court of Ariz., No. 1 CA-SA 03-0150, 2003 WL 22299701 (Ariz. 
Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2003); Lewis v. Harris, No. 15-03 (N.J. Mercer Co. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 2003); 
Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49A02-0305-CV-447 (Ind. Ct. App. May 28, 2003). Recent news reports 
indicate several additional cases filed in February and early March 2004, including lawsuits in 
California, Florida, New York, Oregon, Washington, and West Virginia. Dean E. Muphy, California 
Court to Get Case on Gay Marriages; NEW YORK TIMES, Feb. 23, 2004, at A19; Stephen Nohlgren, 
State Ban on Gay Marriage Being Tested, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, at 1A; Mark 
Larabee, Lawsuits Target Gay Marriage, THE OREGONIAN, Mar. 5, 2004, at A01; Jonathan Martin, 
Same-Sex Couples to Sue Over State Marriage Laws, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004, at A1; Gay 
Marriage Spreads to West Virginia, 365Gay.com, Mar. 6, 2004, available at 
http://www.365gay.com/newscon04/03/030604wvaMarr.htm; Lambda Sues New York for Same-Sex 
Marriage Rights, ADVOCATE, Mar. 6, 2004, available at http://www.advocate.com/ 
new_news.asp?ID=11576&sd=03/06/04-03/08/04. 
 36. Including the ten published opinions and the three pending cases. 
 37. Adams v. Howerton, the only exception, was an immigration case in which the plaintiffs 
argued, in part, that the equal protection and due process guarantees of the United States 
Constitution required the recognition of same-sex “marriages” under Colorado law. 486 F. Supp. 
1119, 1124-25 (D.C. Cal. 1980). 
 38. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for lack of substantial federal question, 
409 U.S. 810 (1972) (asserting rights of due process, privacy and equal protection under the Ninth 
and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution); see also Jurisdictional Statement at 
3, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (No. 71-1027) (copy on file with author). 
 39. 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (D.C. Cal. 1980) (asserting federal guarantees of equal 
protection and due process). 
 40. 653 A.2d 307, 331, 362 (D.C. 1995) (asserting a fundamental right to marry person of 
one’s choice under Due Process Clause of Fifth Amendment as well as guarantee of equal protection 
under Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause). 
 41. No. 1 CA-SA 03-0150, 77 P.3d 451, 454 (Ariz. Ct. App. Oct. 8, 2003) (asserting 
fundamental right to marry and guarantee of equal protection under both state and federal 
constitutions). 
 42. Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health also contained a federal claim based upon the free 
speech clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, but the claim did not figure 
prominently in the litigation. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003). 
 43. 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
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the state’s failure to grant a marriage license to persons of the same sex 
violated constitutional guarantees of equal protection, due process and 
privacy.44 Though no written opinion was issued, the dismissal for lack 
of a substantial federal question constitutes a substantive ruling on the 
merits.45 Lower federal courts are bound to follow the ruling unless or 
until the Supreme Court overrules it.46 This ruling obviously dampened 
the prospects of future equal protection, due process, and privacy claims 
made under the United States Constitution, and may (at least partially) 
account for the fact that the majority of subsequent cases have relied 
upon state constitutional claims. 
Over the past three decades the concept of same-sex “marriage” has 
become increasingly accepted in the legal academy, such that ideas 
virtually unheard of prior to 1970 are now part of the academic 
orthodoxy in many circles.47 Over time, this ideology has spread 
throughout the legal profession, as prominent attorneys and bar 
associations have shown increasing willingness to support the effort to 
gain legal recognition for same-sex marriage.48 
 
 44. Appellants in the case presented three constitutional questions: (1) “Whether appellee’s 
refusal to sanctify appellants’ marriage deprives appellants of their liberty to marry and of their 
property without due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment”; (2) “Whether appellee’s 
refusal, pursuant to Minnesota marriage statutes, to sanctify appellants’ marriage because both are of 
the male sex violates their rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”; 
and (3) “Whether appellee’s refusal to sanctify appellants’ marriage deprives appellants of their right 
to privacy under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Jurisdictional Statement at 3, Baker v. 
Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (No. 71-1027). 
 45. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-45 (1975). 
 46. See Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (D.C. Cal. 1980). 
 47. Prior to 1980, only a handful of articles even discussed the topic of same-sex “marriage.” 
See, e.g., Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons 
in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 874-78 (1979); Comment, Fundamental Interests and 
the Question of Same-Sex Marriage, 15 TULSA L.J. 141 (1979); Comment, Homosexuals’ Right to 
Marry: A Constitutional Test and a Legislative Solution, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 193 (1979); Note, The 
Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573 (1973). Even prior to 1990, a Westlaw search 
reveals only 21 published law review articles that contain the phrase “same-sex marriage.” During 
the next five years, from 1990-1994, 198 articles contained some reference or discussion of “same-
sex marriage,” and between 1995-1999, the number of new articles jumped to 849. A more detailed 
review by the Marriage Law Project of approximately 150 published law review articles written on 
the topic of same-sex “marriage” between 1990 and 1999 shows further that roughly seventy-five 
percent of these articles favor the legal recognition of same-sex “marriage.” See “Bibliography of 
Law Review Articles Relating to the Issue of Same-Sex ‘Marriage,’” Marriage Law Project, 
available at: http://marriagelaw.cua.edu/Bibliogr.htm. 
 48. William C. Duncan, “A Lawyer Class”: Views on Marriage and “Sexual Orientation” In 
The Legal Profession, 15 B.Y.U. J.PUB.L. 137 (2001). In the Massachusetts marriage litigation, each 
of the amicus briefs filed in support of the plaintiffs was filed by a major Boston law firm, and 
several briefs were filed on behalf of bar associations, including the Boston Bar Association and the 
Massachusetts Bar Association. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Massachusetts Bar Association, 
Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, Docket # SJC-08860; Brief of Amici Curiae Boston Bar 
Association, Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, Docket # SJC-08860. 
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2. Marriage litigation in the 1970’s 
The first generation of same-sex marriage cases began when the 
Hennepin County Clerk refused to issue a marriage license to Richard 
Baker and James McConnell on May 22, 1970.49 Shortly thereafter, 
Baker and McConnell filed the lawsuit that would ultimately make its 
way to the United States Supreme Court as Baker v. Nelson, discussed 
above.50 Each of the other three constitutional challenges to state 
marriage laws filed in the 1970’s ended in a similar result, with one case 
decided at the state supreme court level, one at the state intermediate 
court of appeals, and one in federal district court.51 
3. Marriage litigation in the 1990’s 
During the 1990’s the outcome of marriage litigation became less 
predictable. Of the five cases filed during the 1990’s, each ultimately 
upheld the constitutionality of state marriage laws, though with three 
significant caveats and only in the face of legislative and popular 
intervention. 
In Baehr v. Lewin, the eldest in this second generation of marriage 
cases, the Hawaii Supreme Court shocked even the plaintiffs with its 
1993 ruling that the marriage law constituted sex discrimination, 
requiring application of a strict scrutiny analysis under the Hawaii 
Constitution.52 On remand, the trial court entered a number of factual 
findings that reflect the heavy burden of proof required under the strict 
scrutiny standard imposed by the Hawaii Supreme Court: 
Defendant presented insufficient evidence and failed to establish or 
prove the legal significance of the institution of traditional marriage 
and the need to protect traditional marriage as a fundamental structure 
in society. 
 
 49. Jurisdictional Statement at 3-4, Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (No. 71-1027). 
 50. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed for lack of substantial 
federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
 51. Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1974); Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119 (D.C. Cal. 1980); see also William C. Duncan, 
Same-Sex Marriage Litigation: An Historical Overview, 18 BYU J. PUB. L. 623 (2004). 
 52. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); see also, Andrew Koppelmann, Why 
Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 209 
n.40 (1994) 
The sex discrimination argument had been such a uniform loser before Baehr that when 
that case was litigated, neither the plaintiff nor the amici even bothered to make the 
argument. . . . Nor was the sex discrimination issue raised by the court at oral argument. 
The majority opinion therefore was a surprise to all the parties. Telephone Interview with 
Daniel R. Foley, attorney for plaintiffs in Baehr v. Lewin (Apr. 19, 1994). 
Id. 
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* * * 
A father and a mother can, and do, provide his or her child with unique 
paternal and maternal contributions which are important, though not 
essential, to the development of a happy, healthy and well-adjusted 
child. 
* * * 
In Hawaii, and elsewhere, same-sex couples can, and do, have 
successful, loving and committed relationships. 
* * * 
In Hawaii, and elsewhere, people marry for a variety of reasons 
including, but not limited to the following: (1) having or raising 
children; (2) stability and commitment; (3) emotional closeness; (4) 
intimacy and monogamy; (5) the establishment of a framework for a 
long-term relationship; (6) personal significance; (7) recognition by 
society; and (8) certain legal and economic protections, benefits and 
obligations.53 
Finally, in its conclusions of law, the court wrote: 
Defendant presented meager evidence with regard to the importance of 
the institution of traditional marriage, the benefits which that 
relationship provides to the community and, most importantly, the 
adverse effects, if any, which same-sex marriage would have on the 
institution of traditional marriage and how those adverse effects would 
impact on the community and society. The evidentiary record in this 
case is inadequate to thoughtfully examine and decide these significant 
issues.54 
From all appearances, by December of 1996 Hawaii was well on its 
way to becoming the first jurisdiction in the world to officially recognize 
a marriage between two persons of the same sex.55 Before the Hawaii 
 
 53. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *17-18 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996). 
 54. Id. at *20. 
 55. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional 
Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965 (1997). 
It finally happened. On Tuesday, December 3, 1996, a Honolulu judge struck down a 
Hawaiian law permitting only opposite-sex couples to marry, and Hawaii became the first 
state to recognize same-sex marriages. . . . We can confidently predict that Hawaii will 
recognize same-sex marriages, for while the trial court stayed its mandate pending 
appeal, it is very unlikely that the decision will be overturned. 
Id.; Daniel B. Foley, The State of Gay Marriage: Will Hawaii Lead the Way?, 20 FAM. ADVOC. 39 
(Summer 1997) (“The Hawaii Supreme Court was briefed on the lower court decision in June 1997, 
and the final decision, expected by year’s end, is likely to affirm the December 3, 1996, ruling in 
favor of same-sex marriage.”) (Mr. Foley was counsel to the three same-sex couples who were 
plaintiffs in the Baehr litigation). 
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Supreme Court would again rule in the marriage litigation, however, the 
oft-criticized reasoning of the court’s 1993 plurality opinion56 was 
rejected by the Legislature and by the people of the state of Hawaii. 
While the case was making its second trip on appeal through the Hawaii 
court system, the legislature presented Hawaiian voters with the 
opportunity to vote on a constitutional amendment which provided, “The 
Legislature shall have authority to reserve marriage to opposite-sex 
couples.”57 On November 3, 1998, Hawaiian voters ratified the 
amendment by a 69 percent to 29 percent margin,58 effectively 
terminating the litigation eight years after it had begun.59 
While the Hawaii litigation was in progress, courts in New York and 
the District of Columbia rejected constitutional challenges to the 
marriage laws of those jurisdictions,60 and an Alaskan couple filed suit in 
Anchorage.61 
Moving much more quickly than Baehr, the Alaskan marriage 
litigation also prompted a state constitutional amendment after trial judge 
Peter Michalski granted the plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on 
February 27, 1998, applied a strict scrutiny standard, and ordered an 
additional hearing to determine whether the state could demonstrate a 
compelling state interest which supported the marriage law.62 In reaching 
 
 56. See, e.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A BOOK OF LEGAL LISTS: THE BEST AND WORST IN 
AMERICAN LAW 182-84 (1997) (describing the 1993 Baehr opinion as one of the ten worst state 
supreme court decisions in American history and “an affront to both law and language that well 
deserves its place on the list of worst decisions.”); David O. Coolidge, The Hawai’i Marriage 
Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning, and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19, 26 n.22 (2000). 
In my opinion, the plurality opinion contradicts itself. In the first half of the opinion, 
during its ‘due process’ analysis, the plurality operates from the historic view of 
marriage, and finds the existing male-female marriage statute constitutional. In the 
second half, engaged in its ‘equal protection’ analysis, the plurality switches the unit of 
analysis from that of an individual entering a social institution, to that of ‘couples’ 
entering a formal partnership status created by the State. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 57. See H.R. 117, S.D. 1, C.D. 1, Conf. Comm. Rep. No. 1 (1997). On April 29, 1997, the 
proposed Marriage Amendment was approved in the Senate with 25 Ayes and 0 Nays, and in the 
House with 44 Ayes, 6 Nays, and 1 Excused. See 1997 HAW. SENATE J. 766; 1997 HAW. HOUSE J. 
922, cited in David O. Coolidge, The Hawai’i Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning, and 
Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19, 19 n.3 (2000). 
 58. Constitutional Amendment: Legislative Power to Reserve Marriage to Opposite Sex 
Couples, Nov. 3, 1998, available at http://www.state.hi.us/elections/reslt98/general/ 98swgen.html 
(p.004, middle column) (285,384 votes in favor (69.2%), 117,827 votes opposed (28.6%), 8,422 
blank votes (2.0%), and 887 overvotes (0.2%)). 
 59. Baehr v. Miike, 994 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1999). See also David O. Coolidge, The Hawai’i 
Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning and Constitutionality, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19 (2000). 
 60. Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Storrs v. Holcomb 645 
N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996), appeal dismissed, 666 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1997). 
 61. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. 
Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). 
 62. Id. at *6. 
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his decision, Judge Michalski declared that marriage is “the recognition 
of one’s choice of a life partner,” and held that article I, section 22 of the 
Alaska Constitution guarantees this freedom of choice.63 
In an effort to head off the threatened judicial redefinition of 
marriage, the Alaska legislature quickly drafted a marriage amendment 
to the Alaska Constitution, approving it in May, defending it against a 
legal challenge decided in September, and sending it to the voters for 
ratification in November 1998, just eight months after Judge Michalski’s 
trial opinion.64 Meanwhile, in June 1998, the Alaska Supreme Court 
refused to consider the state’s appeal in the Brause case,65 allowing the 
litigation to go forward until Alaskan voters effectively foreclosed the 
litigation on November 3, 1998, approving the Alaska marriage 
amendment by a 68 to 32 percent margin.66 
Of the five marriage cases of the 1990’s, Baker v. State came nearest 
a judicial redefinition of marriage. In its December 1999 ruling, the 
Vermont Supreme Court stopped just shy of striking down the Vermont 
marriage laws, holding that the Vermont constitution required the 
extension of “equal benefits” to same-sex couples, ordering the 
legislature to create a system by which to provide marital benefits for 
same-sex couples, and noting that future litigation may find that the 
 
 63. Id. at *1. Judge Michalski also suggested that the marriage law violated equal protection 
guarantees, but rested his decision on the privacy analysis. Brause v. Bureau of Vital Statistics, No. 
3AN-95-6562, 1998 WL 88743 (Alaska Super. Ct. Feb. 27, 1998). See also Kevin G. Clarkson et al., 
The Alaska Marriage Amendment: The People’s Choice on the Last Frontier, 16 ALASKA L. REV. 
213, 218-224 (1999). 
 64. See Clarkson, supra note 63, at 214 n.2. 
See S.J. Res. 42, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 1998). The final version of the 
Amendment approved by the Legislature proposed to add a new section to article I of the 
Alaska Constitution that reads as follows: “Section 25. Marriage. To be valid or 
recognized in this State, a marriage may exist only between one man and one woman. No 
provision of this constitution may be interpreted to require the State to recognize or 
permit marriage between individuals of the same sex.” The proposed amendment passed 
the House by a vote of 28-12, see House J. 3785, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. Sess. (Alaska 
1998), and the Senate passed the amendment 14-6, Senate J. 4157, 20th Leg., 2d Legis. 
Sess. (Alaska 1998). Between approval and ratification, the Alaska Supreme Court struck 
the second sentence from the Marriage Amendment. See Bess v. Ulmer, Nos. S-8811, S-
8812, S-8821, Preliminary Opinion and Order, at 8 (Alaska Sept. 22, 1998), aff’d, Bess v. 
Ulmer, Nos. S-8811, S- 8812, S-8821, 1999 WL 619092 (Alaska Aug. 17, 1999). On 
November 3, 1998, the one-sentence version of the Marriage Amendment was ratified by 
the people by a vote of 68% to 32%. See Cheryl Wetzstein, Gays Can’t ‘Marry’ 2 States 
Say, WASHINGTON TIMES, Nov. 5, 1998, at A16. 
Id. 
 65. High Court Declines Same-Sex Case, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, June 6, 1998, at D1. 
 66. Measure No. 2, “Constitutional Amendment Limiting Marriage,” Nov. 3, 1998, available 
at http://www.gov.state.ak.us/ltgov/elections/elect98/general/results.htm (152,965 votes in favor 
(68.11%) and 71631 opposed (31.89%)); see also Bess v. Ulmer, 985 P.2d 979 (Alaska 1999) 
(affirming validity of marriage amendment); Brause v. Dep’t. of Health and Soc. Servs., 21 P.3d 357 
(Alaska 2001) (rejecting unmarried couple’s claim for marital benefits). 
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marriage itself unconstitutionally discriminates against same-sex 
couples. 67 Perhaps in a compromise crafted in order to reach its 
unanimous opinion, the Baker court carefully avoided any discussion of 
the definition of marriage, ostensibly turning Baker into a case about 
benefits only.68 
4. Current marriage litigation 
In a November 6, 2003 editorial, Detroit News editor and syndicated 
columnist Deb Price writes: 
As in real estate, the secret to success in any civil rights struggle is 
three words: location, location, location. And a recent Arizona state 
court ruling against a marriage-minded gay couple serves as a painful 
reminder that those of us who are gay need to pick our legal battles— 
and our battlegrounds— very carefully. That’s especially true now that 
we are so clearly winning. . . . Lambda [Legal Defense and Education 
Fund], the American Civil Liberties Union and the Freedom to Marry 
Coalition have terrific ideas on how to change the legal terrain in your 
home state.69 
Over the last five years, these three organizations, accompanied by 
the Boston-based Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD), have 
played an increasingly prominent role in shaping the litigation effort to 
achieve legal recognition of same-sex marriage. This role has included 
the filing of strategic litigation in selected jurisdictions,70 efforts to 
dissuade individuals from filing litigation in states that might prove 
counter-productive to the national effort,71 and attempts to mitigate the 
impact of litigation that threatens to impact the cause adversely.72 
 
 67. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999). 
 68. Id., discussed further infra, section II.B.2. 
 69. Deb Price, Gays Must Pick Battles Wisely, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Nov. 6, 2003 
(institutional website omitted) (Lambda Legal is available at http://www.lambdalegal.org; the ACLU 
is available at http://www.aclu.org; and the Freedom to Marry Coalition is available at 
http://www.freedomtomarry.org.). 
 70. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dept. of Publ. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Lewis v. 
Harris, 2003 WL 23191114 (N.J. Super. L., Nov. 5, 2003), appeal pending; Snetsinger v. Board of 
Regents, No. 03-238 (Mont. Sup. Ct.). 
 71. Judy Nichols, Committed to Gay Marriage in Arizona, Couple Struggle with Suit to Wed, 
ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sept. 1, 2003, at A1 (reporting a meeting in which representatives from the 
ALCU, Lambda Legal, and the Arizona Human Rights Foundation met with the plaintiffs in the 
Standhardt case, urging them to drop their lawsuit); Robert L. Pela, Here Come the Grooms: Local 
Poster Boys for Gay Marriage Want It All, PHOENIX NEW TIMES, Aug. 21, 2003 (In response to a 
question about criticism the plaintiffs received in Standhardt for continuing with the marriage 
litigation, Tod Keltner stated, “We’ve heard things like ‘We’d like to strangle those guys.’ There’s a 
lot of concern with our court case because of the backlash, the implications, the expending of 
resources in Arizona.” Don Standhardt continued, “And for that reason, we’re not asking any gay 
group for anything, and we never plan to. We plan to do this on our own. I guess I’m a bad 
[homosexual], but I didn’t know any of these agencies even existed. I didn’t know the Arizona 
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In a joint advisory issued following the Ontario Court of Appeals’ 
decision redefining marriage in that Canadian province, Lambda, GLAD, 
the National Center for Lesbian Rights, Freedom to Marry, and the 
ACLU Lesbian and Gay Rights Project advised gay and lesbian couples: 
For those who contemplate litigation as a response to discrimination 
against their marriage, it is critical to remember that any legal case has 
profound implications beyond the individuals involved. Please contact 
the organizations below who have the most experience litigating on 
marriage, civil unions and the rights of GLBT people and who have 
definite thoughts about what, when and where litigation is and is not 
advisable for taking our movement forward. Couples should absolutely 
not race across the border just to set up lawsuits; the wrong cases could 
set us back for years. We will be strongest if we work together.73 
Since Baker, four additional cases have challenged the 
constitutionality of state laws that explicitly or implicitly recognize 
marriage as an exclusively male-female union. In each case, the lawsuits 
have alleged that state constitutional provisions render the marriage laws 
unconstitutional, while the Arizona lawsuit also includes claims based 
upon the United States Constitution. 
a. Massachusetts. The first and most prominent of the four post-Baker 
cases arose in Massachusetts, setting the stage for the November 2003 
decision which made the Massachusetts Supreme Court the first in the 
nation to recognize same-sex marriage. In April 2001, the Boston-based 
Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders (GLAD), an organization that 
also served as co-counsel for the plaintiffs in Baker, filed suit 
challenging the Commonwealth’s marriage laws on behalf of seven 
same-sex couples.74 As in other cases, the couples satisfied all 
requirements of eligibility for marriage except for the definitional 
requirement of a man and a woman. The couples had applied for and 
 
Human Rights Fund was around, I didn’t know about Freedom to Marry was there, or Lambda 
Legal. And once we did hear of them, and we did call them, they were just so pretentious and 
negative toward us, I just [wrote them off.]”). 
 72. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union, Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 
47 (Ga. Ct. App.) (No. A01A1827); Brief of Amicus Curiae Lambda Legal Defense and Education 
Fund, Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47  (Ga. Ct. App.) (No. A01A1827); Brief of Amici Curiae Gay 
and Lesbian Advocates and Defenders, Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App.) (No. 
A01A1827). 
 73. Joint Advisory from Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders, Lambda Legal Defense & 
Education Fund, National Center for Lesbian Rights, ACLU Lesbian & Gay Rights Project, Freedom 
to Marry (June 2003), available at: http://www.glad.org/GLAD_Cases/ 
Canadian_Marriage_Joint_Advisory.shtml. See also Hayley Mick, U.S. Same-sex Pairs Advised to 
Think Twice Before Marriage in Canada, CANADIAN PRESS, July 13, 2003. 
 74. 744 A.2d 864, 866 (listing Mary Bonauto of Gay & Lesbian Advocates & Defenders as 
co-counsel for the plaintiffs). 
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been denied marriage licenses, giving them standing to challenge the 
marriage laws.75 
The complaint contained five principal allegations. First, the 
complaint alleged that, in the absence of a statutory definition of 
marriage in the Massachusetts General Laws, the common law definition 
of marriage should be construed to encompass couples in a same-sex 
relationship.76 The complaint then alleged that the marriage laws violated 
three distinct sections of the Massachusetts Constitution, including 
guarantees of equality, due process, and the right to pursue happiness.77 
Finally, the complaint also alleged that the definition of marriage 
violated the right to “intimate association” implicitly guaranteed, though 
yet undefined, by the Massachusetts Constitution.78 
Deputy Attorney General Judith Yogman coordinated the state’s 
response, which took the initial form of an answer filed on May 11, 
2001.79 On August 20, 2001, GLAD filed a motion for summary 
judgment, to which the state responded in December 2001 with a 
response and counter motion for summary judgment. Three organizations 
also filed amicus briefs in support of the state’s motion for summary 
judgment.80 
On May 7, 2002, Superior Court Judge Thomas Connolly issued a 
26-page opinion granting summary judgment in favor of the state, and 
denying the plaintiffs’ motion. In the opinion, Judge Connolly focused 
specifically on the plaintiff’s argument that the Massachusetts 
Constitution of 1780 guarantees a fundamental right to marry “the person 
of one’s choice,” virtually ignoring their equal protection claims.81 
The case was subsequently appealed to the Massachusetts Court of 
Appeals and the state filed a motion for direct appellate review by the 
 
 75. Complaint  ¶¶ 122-148, Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 591 
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) (C.A. No. 01-1647-A). 
 76. Id.  ¶ 153; Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 4, 
Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, C.A. No. 01-1647-A. 
 77. Complaint  ¶ 153. 
 78. Id.; Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 60, 
Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 591 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) (C.A. No. 01-
1647-A). 
 79. Answer, Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 591 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
2002) (C.A. No. 01-1647-A). 
 80. Brief of Amicus Curiae Massachusetts Family Institute, Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. 
Health, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 591 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) (C.A. No. 01-1647-A); Brief of Amicus 
Curiae Marriage Law Project, Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 591 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. 2002) (C.A. No. 01-1647-A); Brief of Amicus Curiae American Center for Law and 
Justice, Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 591 (Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) (C.A. 
No. 01-1647-A). 
 81. Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 14 Mass. L. Rptr. 591, 2002 WL 1299135 at *5-*11, 
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2002). 
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state Supreme Judicial Court (SJC).82 Briefing at the SJC was completed 
in December 2002, as numerous amicus parties added their briefs to 
those filed by GLAD and by the State. Overall, eleven amicus briefs 
were filed on behalf of the plaintiffs, with an additional sixteen briefs 
filed in support of the state’s position.83 Oral arguments in the case were 
held on March 4, 2003.84 The SJC customarily issues opinions within 
130 days of oral argument, a practice that was waived in this case on July 
14, 2003.85 
As the first marriage case filed after the Vermont Supreme Court 
decision in Baker v. State,86 Goodridge was intended to complete what 
many regard as the unfinished business of Baker. Whereas in Baker, the 
court awarded marital benefits to same-sex couples, the plaintiffs in 
Goodridge expressly rejected marital benefits as an adequate remedy, 
arguing that the status itself is a benefit of marriage, and that denial of 
marital status results in less than full equality.87 
On November 18, 2003, the court responded with a 4-3 decision, 
concluding that the state’s definition of marriage was “incompatible with 
the constitutional principles of respect for individual autonomy and 
equality under the law.”88 In reaching this conclusion, the court wrote 
that “[c]ivil marriage is created and regulated through exercise of the 
police power,” describing the public role of marriage as “central to the 
way the Commonwealth identifies individuals, provides for the orderly 
distribution of property, ensures that children and adults are cared for and 
supported whenever possible from private rather than public funds, and 
tracks important epidemiological and demographic data,”89 
After concluding that the state had discriminated against same-sex 
couples “for no rational reason,”90 the four-justice majority redefined the 
common law definition of “civil marriage to mean the voluntary union of 
 
 82. Application for Direct Appellate Review, Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, 14 Mass. 
L. Rptr. 591(Mass. Super. Ct. 2002) (Appeals Ct. No. 02-P-1162). 
 83. Appellants’ amicus briefs are available at http://www.glad.org/marriage/ 
goodridge_amici.shtml. 
 84. Cheryl Wetzstein, Court to Hear Suit on Gay Unions, WASHINGTON TIMES, Mar. 3, 
2003, at A4. 
 85. Kathleen Burge, SJC Puts Off a Decision on Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, July 15, 
2003, at A1. 
 86. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 87. Complaint at ¶ 31, Goodridge v. Dep’t. of Pub. Health, C.A. No. 01-1647-A, (seeking 
“access to marriage licenses, and the legal and social status of civil marriage, as well as the 
protections, benefits and obligations of marriage. . .  “). 
 88. Goodridge v. Dept. of Publ. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 949 (Mass. 2003). 
 89. Id. at 954. The court then went on to emphasize the “enormous private and social 
advantages” which flow to couples who marry. Id. at 954-55. 
 90. Id. at 968. 
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two persons as spouses, to the exclusion of all others.”91 The court then 
remanded the case to the superior court for entry of judgment, but raised 
questions in the legislature, writing, “Entry of judgment shall be stayed 
for 180 days to permit the Legislature to take such action as it may deem 
appropriate in light of this opinion.”92 
As the legislature weighed its options in light of the court’s ruling, 
the Massachusetts Senate requested an advisory opinion from the court 
on the constitutionality of proposed “civil union” legislation which 
would make same-sex partners legal “spouses,” attaching all the benefits 
and responsibilities of marriage under the law.93 With the 180-day stay 
running and a constitutional convention scheduled for February 11, 2004, 
the court moved quickly, with the same 4-3 majority ruling on February 
3 that “[t]he [civil union] bill maintains an unconstitutional, inferior, and 
discriminatory status for same-sex couples.”94 
Meeting in constitutional convention on February 11 and 12, the 
legislature failed to garner majority support for any single amendment 
proposed, though 175 (of 200) legislators voted for some form of 
amendment.95 When the convention reconvened on March 11, the 
legislature gave preliminary approval to a “compromise” amendment 
simultaneously defining marriage as the union of a man and a woman 
and creating same-sex “civil unions” as the legal 
equivalent of marriage. Approval came despite the lack of majority 
support for the measure, as strategic alliances both kept the amendment 
alive and prevented a “marriage-only” text from advancing.96 On March 
29, amid much controversy, the legislature rejected a last-ditch effort to 
bifurcate the marriage and civil union provisions in the amendment, 
passing the (marriage and civil union) compromise amendment by a final 
vote of 105-92.97 
The amendment must be approved again in 2005 before being placed 
on the ballot for ratification by voters in November 2006. With the 
court’s 180-day stay having expired on May 17, 2004, marriage licenses 
 
 91. Id. at 969. 
 92. Id. at 969-70. 
 93. In re Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 566 (Mass. 2004). 
 94. Id. at 572. Alternatively, the majority opinion also suggests that if “the Legislature were 
to jettison the term ‘marriage’ altogether, it might well be rational and permissible.” Id. at 570, n.4. 
 95. Massachusetts Catholic Conference, Joint Session 2004 Voting Analysis, Feb. 13, 2004, 
available at http://www.macathconf.org/04jointsession1.htm. 
 96. Raphael Lewis, Accord Said to Lack Firm Majority in Gay-Marriage Fight, Lawmakers’ 
Votes Fluid, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 13, 2004, at A1. 
 97. Rick Klein, Vote Ties Civil Unions to Gay-Marriage Ban, Romney to Seek Stay of SJC 
Order, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 30, 2004, at A1. 
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appear likely to issue to same-sex couples in Massachusetts,98 at least 
during the interim period between May 2004 and November 2006. News 
reports indicate, however, that Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney 
and key legislators are considering various ways to postpone issuance of 
marriage licenses to same-sex couples until after November 2006.99 
It is not yet clear at this point whether Massachusetts will ultimately 
break new ground in the full legal recognition of same-sex marriage fall 
back upon the model of Alaska and Hawaii, where the people refused to 
accept a judicial redefinition of marriage. In many respects, the Supreme 
Judicial Court decisions have proven to be only the start of the marriage 
debate in Massachusetts and throughout the United States. With a 
proposed marriage amendment currently pending at the Massachusetts 
Statehouse,100 and a Federal Marriage Amendment gaining support in 
Washington,101 there is an uneasy tension as those on both sides of the 
debate await the Goodridge decision, and wonder whether legislative 
counterpoint will again drown out the judicial melody. 
b. New Jersey. On June 26, 2002, seven same-sex couples filed suit in 
Hudson County Superior Court alleging that the New Jersey marriage 
laws violate the New Jersey Constitution. In contrast to many of the 
marriage cases, the complaint filed by the five lesbian couples and two 
gay male couples contained only two claims for relief – one under an 
equal protection analysis, and the other under a right of privacy that 
ostensibly includes the right to marry. The plaintiff couples are 
represented by the Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, a 
national advocacy and litigation organization that claims to have spent 
more than a year preparing for the lawsuit.102 
Lambda’s preparation was evident in the three-pronged approach 
that simultaneously pressed the concept of same-sex unions in the legal, 
legislative and public arenas. In the legal arena, where other complaints 
have adopted something of a shotgun approach, the legal claims 
presented in Lambda’s lawsuit were narrow and focused, avoiding issues 
that could distract from the main themes being advanced. These twin 
 
 98. A Massachusetts statute prohibits Massachusetts clerks from issuing marriage licenses to 
couples from other states seeking to circumvent their own state’s marriage laws. Mass. Gen. Laws, 
ch. 207, §11 (2003). 
 99. Rick Klein, Romney Warns of “Legal Limbo” Governor Eyes Timing of Vote, Gay 
Marriages, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 14, 2004, at A1. 
 100. 2003 Mass. H. 3190 (“The Marriage Affirmation & Protection Amendment”). 
 101. Mike Allen & Alan Cooperman, Bush Backs Amendment Banning Gay Marriage, 
WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 25, 2004, at A1. 
 102. Complaint, Lewis v. Harris (N.J. Hudson Co. Super. Ct., June 26, 2002) (on file with 
author); Michael Booth, Gay Marriage Suit May Derail Push for ‘Civil Union’ Status, 169 N.J. L.J. 
1 (July 1, 2002); Kate Coscarelli, Same-sex Couples Sue For Right to Marry in N.J., THE STAR-
LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), June 27, 2002, at 017. 
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themes of equality and freedom to marry have also formed the basis for 
legislative deliberations on measures addressing domestic partnerships 
and civil unions.103 Finally, in the third prong of its approach, Lambda 
used the lawsuit and surrounding media coverage to launch a series of 
“town hall” style meetings in which Lambda attorneys and lobbyists met 
with interested citizens across the state.104 
While Lambda and others have worked to develop grassroots 
receptivity to same-sex unions among New Jersey residents, the litigation 
has proceeded slowly, giving activists on both sides of the issue 
opportunity to educate and persuade the general public. At the time of 
the initial complaint, the state filed no response, and Lambda 
subsequently amended its complaint on October 9, 2002, releasing the 
local registrars of vital statistics who had been named in the initial 
complaint and naming only state officials as defendants.105 On November 
22, 2002, a consent order transferred venue to Mercer County, the 
customary venue for lawsuits naming the state as defendant.106 
On February 24, 2003, Deputy Attorney General Patrick DeAlmeida, 
acting on behalf of the defendants, moved to dismiss the complaint.107 
More than ten weeks later, on May 8, 2003, Lambda filed its brief in 
opposition to the motion to dismiss,108 and Judge Linda Feinberg set a 
hearing for June 27, 2003. At the hearing, Judge Feinberg converted the 
motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment, and requested 
further briefing.109 
Shortly after the case was transferred to Mercer County, three 
separate groups filed coordinated applications to intervene in the 
litigation.110 On May 31, 2003, Judge Feinberg denied each of the 
 
 103. 2003 NJ A.3743 (domestic partnerships); 2003 NJ A3762 (civil unions). 
 104. Johanna Duerr, Town Meeting on Gay Unions, Couples Rights Held in Cape May, PRESS 
OF ATLANTIC CITY, May 7, 2003 (describing series of 10 town meetings held in support of marriage 
litigation and legislative measures). 
 105. Brief of Defendants in Support of their Motion to Dismiss at 3, Lewis v. Harris, No. 15-
03 (N. J. Mercer Co. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2003). 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Brief of Plaintiffs in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Lewis v. Harris, No. 
15-03 (N.J. Mercer Co. Super. Ct.). 
 109. See Michelle Han, Gay Couples Fight in Court for Right to Marry; State Argues That 
Debate Belongs in Legislature, NEW JERSEY RECORD, June 28, 2003, at A3. 
 110. The first group consisted of state legislators, represented by lawyers from the American 
Family Association, a national pro-family organization based in Mississippi. The legislators argued 
that they had a constitutional duty to establish public policy for the state of New Jersey, and that the 
litigation threatened their ability to fulfill that responsibility. See Opinion at 3, Lewis v. Harris, No. 
15-03 (N.J. Mercer Co. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 2003). A second group of taxpayers, married couples, and 
local pro-family organizations argued that the litigation would impair their interest in marriage, as it 
currently exists. Id.  Finally, a business owner also sought to intervene, arguing that the outcome of 
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motions to intervene, finding the applicants to have failed to satisfy a 
four-part test required for intervention of right.111 Particularly, Judge 
Feinberg noted, and the attorney for the legislators also conceded, that 
the Attorney General’s office had presented an adequate representation 
of the case, at least up to the point of the hearing.112 In denying the 
motions to intervene, Judge Feinberg granted each of the three groups of 
applicants amicus curiae status.113 
On November 5, 2003, 16 months after the filing of the initial 
complaint, Judge Feinberg released a 71-page opinion granting the 
state’s motion for summary judgment. In her opinion, Judge Feinberg 
rejected the plaintiffs’ contention that a right of same-sex “marriage” is 
guaranteed in the New Jersey Constitution, and concluded that the 
definition of marriage is a matter best left to the New Jersey Legislature, 
noting that “courts will not second-guess the Legislature’s policy 
decisions regarding economic, social and philosophical issues.”114 The 
case is currently pending on appeal.115 
c. Indiana. On July 15, 2002, Marion County Superior Court Judge 
Cynthia Ayers rejected an equal protection challenge to a state personnel 
policy that did not include domestic partners under its spousal benefits 
coverage.116 In her opinion, Judge Ayers concluded that the definition of 
marriage was at the heart of the benefits complaint, stating, “It is clear 
that the plaintiff’s attack here is not on the funeral leave policy, but 
rather on the marriage statute and its preclusion of same-sex 
marriages.”117 Five weeks later, the Indiana Civil Liberties Union 
(ICLU), representing the plaintiff in the benefits case, also filed a 
challenge to the Indiana marriage statute. The ICLU suit was filed on 
behalf of three same-sex couples in Marion County Superior Court, 
seeking to compel the clerks of Marion County and neighboring 
Hendricks County to issue them marriage licenses.118 Alternatively, the 
 
the litigation could impact his employee personnel policies, insurance premiums, and conflict with 
his religious beliefs. Id. 
 111. Id. at 3 n.1. 
 112. Kathy Barrett Carter, Groups Denied Say in Suit on Gay Unions, THE STAR-LEDGER 
(Newark, NJ), Apr. 1, 2003, at 15 (audio recording of hearing on file with author). 
 113. Opinion at 3 n.1, Lewis v. Harris, No. 15-03 (N.J. Mercer Co. Super. Ct. Nov. 5, 2003). 
 114. Id. at 5. 
 115. Michael Ann Knotts, Appeal Ahead on Same-Sex Marriage Ban, 12 N.J. LAW.: WKLY 
NEWSPAPER 2149 (Nov. 10, 2003); Mary P. Gallagher, et al, Never Enough, 174 N.J.L.J 1111 (Dec. 
29, 2003) (noting that notice of appeal was filed on Dec. 22, 2003). 
 116. Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Entry of Summary Judgment, Cornell v. 
Hamilton, No. 49D04-0002-CP-180 (Ind. Marion Super. Ct. July 15, 2002). 
 117. Id. at Conclusions of Law ¶ 16. 
 118. Complaint at 11, Request for Relief ¶ 1, Morrison v. O’Bannon, No. 49D11-0208-PL-
1415 (Ind. Marion Super. Ct. (filed Aug. 22, 2002)). 
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couples, each of which has obtained a civil union license in Vermont, 
argued that the court should recognize them as “spouses” because of 
their legal status under Vermont law.119 
The Indiana Attorney General then intervened to defend the marriage 
statute, and, on January 3, 2003, moved to dismiss the lawsuit for failure 
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, pursuant to Rules 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Indiana Trial Rules.120 The memo filed in 
support of the motion to dismiss argued that the plaintiffs’ allegations 
regarding the tax code were outside the jurisdiction of the superior court, 
that the constitutional claims were without merit, and that federal rules of 
comity and Full Faith and Credit did not require an Indiana court to 
extend legal recognition to the plaintiffs’ “civil unions” entered into 
pursuant to Vermont law.121 
Before responding to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs amended their 
complaint for a second time, dropping their claim for civil union 
recognition.122 Following oral argument, Judge S.K. Reid reserved 
judgment, subsequently dismissing the complaint on May 7, 2003.123 In 
her order, Judge Reid found several state interests sufficient to justify the 
Indiana statute124 defining marriage as a male-female union. These 
interests included: (1) “encouraging procreation to occur in a context 
where both biological parents are present to raise the child,”125 (2) 
“promoting the traditional family as the basic living unit of our free 
society,”126 identifying a societal significance of the biological family, 
and (3) the reflexive interest in “protecting the integrity of traditional 
marriage,”127 recognizing marriage as an objective and independent 
social good. 
The case has been appealed to the Indiana Court of Appeals, where 
the case is currently pending.128 
 
 119. Id. at 11, Request for Relief ¶ 2. 
 120. Defendants’ Rule 12(B)(1) and 12(B)(6) Motion to Dismiss, Morrison v. Sadler, No. 
49D11-0208-PL-1415 (Ind. Marion Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2003). 
 121. Memorandum in Support of Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Morrison v. Sadler, No. 
49D11-0208-PL-1415 (Ind. Marion Super. Ct. Jan. 3, 2003). 
 122. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49D11-0208-PL-1415 
(Ind. Marion Super. Ct. (filed Feb. 3, 2003)). 
 123. Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49D13-02110-PL-001946 (Ind. Marion Super. Ct.). 
 124. IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1 (2003). 
 125. Morrison v. Sadler, No. 49D11-0208-PL-1415, slip op. ¶ 17 (Ind. Marion Super. Ct., 
May 7, 2003). 
 126. Id.  ¶ 23. 
 127. Id.  ¶ 27. 
 128. Unlike previous marriage cases, the Morrison litigation has attracted little amicus 
attention. At the Indiana Court of Appeals, there were no amicus briefs filed in support of the 
Appellants, and only four briefs in support of the State. 
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d. Arizona. On July 7, 2003, two Arizona men filed a special action in 
the Arizona Court of Appeals seeking an order to compel the Superior 
Court to award them a marriage license.129 After the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas,130 handed down on June 
26, 2003, Mr. Harold Standhardt and Mr. Tod Keltner jointly applied for 
a marriage license from the Maricopa County Clerk. When the clerk 
denied the application, the two men circumvented the trial court, taking 
the unusual step of filing directly in the Court of Appeals.131 
Substantively, their complaint alleges that both the Arizona and United 
States Constitutions guarantee a right to marry another person of the 
same sex as a corollary of the constitutional guarantee of privacy 
articulated in Lawrence v. Texas.132 The complaint also invoked the equal 
protection guarantee of the federal constitution and the equal privileges 
and immunities guarantee of the Arizona Constitution.133 
News reports note that Standhardt and Keltner have resisted pressure 
from national gay rights groups urging them to withdraw their lawsuit. 
The pressure is based in strategic concern that litigation in Arizona 
would not advance a national strategy toward the recognition of same-
sex marriage.134 Consistent with this approach, the American Civil 
Liberties Union filed an amicus brief urging the Arizona Court of 
Appeals to refuse to hear the case, but to no avail.135 
The Attorney General’s office136 argued strongly that there is no 
fundamental constitutional right to same-sex “marriage” under either the 
state or federal constitutions, that marriage statutes do not violate 
 
 129. Petition for Special Action, Standhardt v. Superior Court of Ariz., 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2003) (No. 1 CA-SA 03-0150) (July 7, 2003). 
 130. 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003). 
 131. Petition for Special Action, Standhardt v. Superior Court of Ariz., 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2003) (No. 1 CA-SA 03-0150) (Petition for Special Action filed July 7, 2003). 
 132. Id. at 4 (“In Lawrence v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court succinctly recognized 
that gay persons have a fundamental privacy right to marry.” (citations omitted)). 
 133. Id. at 6. 
 134. See, e.g., Judy Nichols, Committed to Gay Marriage in Arizona, Couple Struggle with 
Suit to Wed, ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Sept. 1, 2003, at A1 
(“[The plaintiffs] are walking the Arizona road virtually alone, without help from local 
and national organizations who say they support the cause. In fact, the groups tried to get 
the men to drop the lawsuit because they believe Arizona is the wrong place and this is 
the wrong time to raise the issue of same-sex marriage.”). 
 135. Brief of Amici Curiae American Civil Liberties Union of Arizona and American Civil 
Liberties Union, Standhardt v. Superior Court of Ariz., 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 1 
CA-SA 03-0150). 
 136. As in New Jersey, a state legislator unsuccessfully attempted to intervene in the litigation 
and was granted amicus status. The amicus brief filed by the Alliance Defense Fund on behalf of 
State Senator Mark Anderson reinforced many of the arguments put forward in the Attorney 
General’s response. Response to Special Action Petition by Intervenor-Respondent Senator Mark 
Anderson, Standhardt v. Superior Court of Ariz., 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 1 CA-SA 
03-0150). 
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guarantees of equal protection, and that the state has a legitimate interest 
in linking procreation to childrearing, such that children are being raised 
by their own biological parents whenever possible.137 
On October 8, 2003, a three-judge panel of the Arizona Court of 
Appeals unanimously affirmed the constitutionality of the Arizona 
marriage law, rejecting both the state and federal constitutional claims 
made by Standhardt and Keltner. 138 Though having come and 
(apparently) gone without attracting national media attention, the 
Standhardt opinion is nonetheless significant in at least two respects.139 
First, and perhaps most significantly, Standhardt makes the Arizona 
Court of Appeals the first court to have considered the Supreme Court’s 
Lawrence v. Texas decision in the context of same-sex “marriage.” After 
a summer full of speculation as to how Lawrence would impact the 
marriage debate, the Arizona Court of Appeals was given first 
opportunity for an official interpretation. Plaintiffs’ claim that Lawrence 
implicitly created a fundamental right to marry a partner of the same-sex 
was based in language from the Lawrence decision stating: 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 
112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992), the Court reaffirmed the 
substantive force of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause. 
The Casey decision again confirmed that our laws and tradition afford 
constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to marriage, 
procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing, and 
education. Id., at 851, 112 S.Ct. 2791. In explaining the respect the 
Constitution demands for the autonomy of the person in making these 
choices, we stated as follows: “These matters, involving the most 
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices 
central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the 
right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the 
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters 
could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State.” Ibid. Persons in a homosexual relationship 
may seek autonomy for these purposes, just as heterosexual persons 
do.140 
 
 137. State’s Response to Petition for Special Action at 37, Standhardt v. Superior Court of 
Ariz., 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (No. 1 CA-SA 03-0150) (quoting Lynn D. Wardle, 
“Multiply and Replenish”: Considering Same-Sex Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital 
Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 771 (2001); Maggie Gallagher, What is Marriage For? 
The Public Purposes of Marriage Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 773 (2002)). 
 138. Standhardt v. Superior Court, 77 P.3d 451 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003). 
 139. Plaintiffs have reportedly filed a cert petition with the Arizona Supreme Court. Judy 
Nichols, Appeal Likely Today on Gay-Marriage Ban, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 8, 2003, at B1. 
 140. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 2481-82 (emphasis added by Arizona court). 
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The Arizona court concluded that this language does not set forth a 
fundamental right to enter into same-sex marriages, giving three reasons 
for its conclusion.141 First, the court noted that elsewhere in the Lawrence 
decision, the Supreme Court explicitly held that its decision “[did] not 
involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any 
relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”142 Secondly, the 
Arizona court concluded that “these purposes” described by the Supreme 
Court in Lawrence referred back to the Casey quotation, establishing a 
right of homosexual persons to make “‘intimate and personal choices’ 
that reflect ‘one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
and of the mystery of human life’ free from government compulsion.”143 
Finally, the Arizona court noted that the Lawrence decision did not 
declare sexual activity between persons of the same sex to be a 
fundamental right, applying the rational basis test in striking down the 
Texas statute.144 In the absence of a clearly established fundamental right 
to sexual activity, the Arizona court was unable to find a fundamental 
right to same-sex marriage.145 
The Standhardt decision is also significant in that the court 
recognized the state’s interest in “encouraging procreation and child-
rearing within the stable environment traditionally associated with 
marriage.”146 In its opinion, the Court of Appeals adopted the State’s 
argument that the benefits and responsibilities linked to marriage 
communicate the state’s concern that men and women undertake a 
commitment to each other for the good of the children that they 
produce.147 While acknowledging that not all married couples have 
children, the Court nonetheless held the marriage statute a reasonable 
effort to further the link between marriage, procreation and 
childrearing.148 
The court also addressed plaintiffs’ equal protection arguments, 
briefly noting that the Arizona marriage law “furthers a proper legislative 
end and was not enacted simply to make same-sex couples unequal to 
everyone else,”149 distinguishing the Arizona marriage statute from the 
Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans.150 
 
 141. Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 456-57. 
 142. Id. at 456 (quoting Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2484). 
 143. Id. at 457 (quoting Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2481-82). 
 144. Id. at 457. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 461. 
 147. Id. at 462-63. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. at 465 
 150. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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5. Marriage legislation 
Since 1994, state legislatures across the nation have considered 
marriage recognition (DOMA) legislation that has now been adopted in 
38 states.151 Over the past three years, however, the legislative debate has 
begun to shift, as advocates of same-sex marriage have introduced same-
sex marriage legislation in several states and proponents of traditional 
marriage have, at least in part, turned their attention to state and federal 
constitutional amendments.152 In the 2001 legislative session, same-sex 
marriage bills were introduced in three states (Connecticut, New York 
and Rhode Island),153 a number which climbed to five states in the 2003 
session (Connecticut, New York, Rhode Island, Montana, and 
Massachusetts).154 
Though few of these measures have even received a legislative 
hearing, they still play an important strategic role in the campaign for 
same-sex marriage. As the sponsors of such legislation often explain, 
even in defeat the proposed legislation serves a long-term educational 
purpose, providing a context in which to discuss the topic of same-sex 
marriage with legislative colleagues and the general public.155 In 
addition, such measures may triangulate state DOMA measures, creating 
a safe haven of passive neutrality for undecided legislators hesitant to 
take sides on a controversial issue. 
Following the Massachusetts marriage decision, legislators in at least 
18 states quickly introduced marriage amendments to their state 
constitutions in an effort to foreclose the possibility of similar litigation 
in their states.156 
 
 151. See supra note 21. 
 152. Though beyond the scope of this article, same-sex marriage legislation has recently been 
adopted in two European nations: Netherlands and Belgium. Stb. 2001, No. 9 (“Act on the Opening 
Up of Marriage”) (Bill 22672) (Dec. 21, 2000); Associated Press, Belgium Votes to Recognize Gay 
Marriages, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Jan. 31, 2003, at 6. In November 2002, Statistics Netherlands, the 
official Dutch statistics agency, reported that “[s]ame-sex couples do not seem to be very interested 
in marriage,” after finding that only 10% of the Netherlands’ estimated 50,000 same-sex couples had 
married during the first 18 months after the new marriage law took effect. Press release, “More 
Marriages and More Partnerships,” Statistics Netherlands, Nov. 27, 2002. 
 153. 2001 Conn. A.B. 6032; 2001 N.Y. S.B. 1205; 2001 R.I. H.B. 5608. 
 154. 2003 Conn. H.B. 6389; 2003 Mass. H.B. 3677; 2003 Mont. H.B. 607; 2003 N.Y. A. 
7392; 2003 R.I. H.B. 5861; 2003 R.I. S.B. 496. 
 155. See, e.g., Cheryl Wetzstein, California Gay-Union Bill Pulled; Family Advocates Apply 
Pressure, WASHINGTON TIMES, Jan. 17, 2002, at A10 (quoting California Assemblyman Paul Koretz 
after withdrawal of his domestic partnership bill: “I’ll be here for at least five years. These same-sex 
families are here to stay. This issue is here to stay. And whether it’s this year or next year, the bill 
will be back.”). 
 156. See, e.g., 2004 Al. H.B. 8; 2004 Ariz. Sen. Con. Res. 1015; 2003 Ga. Sen. Res. 595; 2004 
Id. H.J.Res. 9; 2004 Ill. H.C.A. 24 [couldn’t find]; 2004 Ind. Sen. J. Res. 7; 2004 Iowa Sen. J. Res. 
2002; 2003 Kan. H.Con.Res. 5033; 2004 Ky. H.B. 95; 2003 Mass. H. 3190; 2004 Md. S.B. 673; 
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Significant as these state efforts are to the future of the marriage 
debate, state legislative efforts have been recently overshadowed by U.S. 
House Joint Resolution 56, proposing a marriage amendment to the 
United States Constitution.157 The Federal Marriage Amendment was 
introduced in Congress on May 21, 2003, and had 115 co-sponsors as of 
March 1, 2004.158 An identical proposal introduced in the Senate on 
November 25, 2003 had nine cosponsors as of March 1.159 The 
amendment effort, spearheaded by the Alliance for Marriage,160 is an 
effort to (1) constitutionally define marriage as the union of a man and a 
woman, and (2) prevent the courts from mandating the creation of a 
quasi-marital status, such as Vermont civil unions. The text of the 
amendment reads: “Marriage in the United States shall consist only of 
the union of a man and a woman. Neither this Constitution or the 
constitution of any State, nor state or federal law, shall be construed to 
require that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon 
unmarried couples or groups.”161 
On September 9, the Administrative Committee of the U.S. 
Conference of Catholic Bishops lent their support to the federal marriage 
amendment effort.162 In an October 2, 2003 press conference, twenty-
four primarily conservative organizations joined together in a Coalition 
to Protect Marriage, pledging to mobilize grassroots support for 
traditional marriage in the months leading up to the 2004 elections.163 
Various commentators have suggested that the Federal Marriage 
Amendment is likely to play a prominent role in the 2004 presidential 
and congressional elections, and may be included as part of the 
Republican Party platform.164 
 
2004 Mich. S.J.Res. 5; 2004 Minn. H.F. 2798; 2004 Miss. H. Con.Res. 56; 2004 Mo. S.J.Res. 29; 
2004 Okla. H.J.Res. 1042; 2004 Utah H.J.Res. 25; 2004 Vt. P. 3; 2004 Wis. A.J.Res. 66. 
 157. U.S. H.R.J.Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 158. Bill Summary and Status for the 108th Congress, available at http://thomas.loc.gov 
(H.J.Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003)). 
 159. Id. (Sen. J. Res. 26, 108th Cong.) 
 160. See http://www.allianceformarriage.org. 
 161. U.S. H.R.J.Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003). 
 162. Press Release, U.S. Catholic Bishops’ Administrative Committee Calls for Protection of 
Marriage, United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Sept. 10, 2003, available at 
http://www.usccb.org/comm/archives/2003/03-179.htm. 
 163. Cheryl Wetzstein, Groups Pledge to Support Marriage; Say Gay Threat Demands 
Action, WASHINGTON TIMES, Oct. 3, 2003, at A1. 
 164. See, e.g., Mark O’Keefe, An Uneasy Union: Religious Groups Come Out Against Gay 
Marriages, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Oct. 16, 2003, at A4 (quoting a May 7 memo from pollster 
Richard Wirthlin which identifies the Federal Marriage Amendment as “an ideal wedge issue” which 
could work to the advantage of the Republican party in the 2004 elections); Mary Leonard, 
Campaign 2004; Gay Marriage Stirs Conservatives Again, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 28, 2003, at A1 
(quoting Republican National Committee Chairman Ed Gillespie as saying that a federal marriage 
amendment may be “addressed in some form or fashion” in the party’s 2004 platform). 
10BAKER.MACRO 5/26/2004  12:58 AM 
569] STATUS, BENEFITS, AND RECOGNITION 597 
B. Marital Benefits Legislation and Cases 
As early as 1973, legal commentators had begun to suggest that 
some status, alternative to marriage, might be created as a means of 
extending certain spousal benefits to same-sex couples. Writing in the 
Yale Law Journal, one commentator suggested: 
Although private consensual homosexual activity might be legalized in 
this country without creating many problems as it was in Great Britain, 
the expansion of marriage to encompass homosexual couples would 
alter the nature of a fundamental institution as traditionally conceived. 
The Supreme Court may in the future decide that such alteration is 
beyond its competence and therefore that marriage should be confined 
to its present definition absent a positive move on the part of individual 
state legislatures to broaden it. If such proves to be the case, particular 
legal benefits available only to married couples might still be attacked 
on equal protection grounds under both the Fourteenth and Twenty-
seventh Amendments. 
If the Court granted homosexuals some of these benefits – without 
compelling states to grant marriage licenses – it might eventually create 
a ‘quasi-marital’ status. State legislatures might explicitly grant such a 
status, and specify the attendant rights.165 
Twenty-five years later, these words proved prophetic, as first the 
Oregon Court of Appeals,166 then the Vermont Supreme Court,167 ruled 
that same-sex couples were constitutionally entitled to the rights and 
benefits of marriage. While clearly tied to the marriage controversy, as 
with other aspects of the marriage debate, the manner in which that 
connection is made becomes very significant. 
Legislatures have long been in the business of linking benefits and 
marriage, and are particularly suited to sever that connection where 
appropriate for a particular benefit. For example, where state law bundles 
numerous benefits and responsibilities as part of the marriage “package,” 
a legislative body may evaluate each of those rights and determine which 
in fact further the state’s interests in marriage, which are common to all 
parents, and which should be made applicable to all individuals 
regardless of marital or parental status. To the Vermont Court, however, 
equipped only with the hammer of “common benefits,” every benefit, 
protection, or responsibility of marriage suddenly became a nail, leaving 
 
 165. Note, The Legality of Homosexual Marriage, 82 YALE L.J. 573, 588-89 (1973). 
 166. Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (finding the Oregon 
Constitution to require state employers to treat domestic partners equally with married couples). 
 167. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (finding the Vermont Constitution to require that 
same-sex couples be granted all the legal rights, benefits, and responsibilities of marriage). 
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the court no room to consider whether certain functions of marriage 
might still serve a valid purpose under state law, distinguishing marriage 
from other relationships. Litigation thus becomes a blunt instrument, ill 
equipped to respond to the exigencies of a given factual setting. 
1. Domestic Partnerships 
Unlike the debate over the definition of marriage itself, most of the 
debate over spousal benefits for same-sex couples has in fact occurred in 
legislative bodies. Nationally, a handful of states and various local 
governments have extended some form of recognition to same-sex 
partnerships. 168 These relationships often mirror various requirements for 
marriage, but are narrower in scope than marriage.169 Usually established 
under the rubric of “domestic partnerships,” most policies are limited to 
employee benefits for unmarried partners of government employees.170 A 
number of jurisdictions have also adopted “domestic partner registries,” 
permitting same-sex couples to formally register their partnership, 
though such registries often carry few substantive benefits.171 
 
 168. While some private employers also offer domestic partner benefits to their employees, 
this article focuses on domestic partnership policies in the public sector. In the private sector, recent 
reports from the Human Rights Campaign indicate that 5667 private employers offer spousal 
benefits for the domestic partners of their employees, comprising approximately 0.11% of the 
nation’s 5.3 million employers as documented in the U.S. Census Bureau’s 1997 Economic Census.  
See “Company Summary: 1997 Economic Census” at 15, Table 1 United States Census Bureau, 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ec97/e97cs-1.pdf; “Domestic Partner Benefits,” Human 
Rights Campaign, available at http://www.hrc.org/worknet/dp/index.asp. The numbers are 
significantly higher among Fortune 500 companies, though still a minority as the Human Rights 
Campaign counts 202 of the Fortune 500 that offer domestic partner benefits, approximately 40% of 
the nation’s largest companies. In 1997, the City of San Francisco adopted a benefits plan requiring 
private employers to offer domestic partner benefits in order to be eligible to compete for city 
contracts. The cities of Los Angeles and Seattle subsequently adopted similar ordinances. Los 
Angeles Admin. Code, Div. 10, Chap. 1, Art. 1, § 10.8.2; Seattle Mun. Code § 20.45.020. Five years 
later, based on data showing that 75% of the 4500 businesses that offered domestic partner benefits 
in 2002 did so in order to comply with the San Francisco city ordinance. San Francisco Human 
Rights Commission, Five Year Report on the San Francisco Equal Benefits Ordinance, Nov. 14, 
2002, at 1. 
 169. The definition of a domestic partner put forward by the Oregon Court of Appeals 
contains many typical elements, though wide variation exists between jurisdictions. Tanner v. Or. 
Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435, 439 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (defining “domestic partners” as (1) 
“homosexual persons,” (2) “not related by blood closer than first cousins,” (3) “who are not legally 
married,” (4) “who have continuously lived together,” (5) “in an exclusive and loving relationship,” 
(6) “that they intend to maintain for the rest of their lives,” (7) “who have joint financial accounts,” 
and (8) “joint financial responsibilities,” (9) “who would be married to each other if Oregon law 
permitted it,” (10) “who have no other domestic partners,” and (11) “who are 18 years of age or 
older”). See also William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States: A Review 
and Critique, 2001 BYU L. REV. 961 (2001) (surveying 35 domestic partnership ordinances). 
 170. See William C. Duncan, Domestic Partnership Laws in the United States: A Review and 
Critique, 2001 BYU L. REV. 961 (2001). 
 171. See id. 
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Three states offer some form of legally recognized status that confers 
certain legal rights and benefits upon same-sex couples. Hawaii was the 
first, adopting its “reciprocal beneficiary” statute in 1997 as part of a 
legislative compromise allowing the marriage amendment to move 
forward. Under the reciprocal beneficiary law, any two adults who 
cannot legally marry (including parent/child, roommates, siblings, etc.) 
may enter into a reciprocal beneficiary relationship and receive sixty 
statutory rights and benefits available to married couples, including 
survivorship rights, health insurance, and joint property ownership.172 
The most well known of the three systems exists in Vermont, where the 
legislature adopted “civil unions” in 2000, extending to registered same-
sex couples all the legal benefits and responsibilities of marriage.173 
Lesser known is the fact that Vermont also adopted a “reciprocal 
beneficiary” statute in 2000.174 Unlike the civil union statute that 
provides broad rights for same-sex couples, the reciprocal beneficiary 
statute provides a smaller set of spousal benefits to close relatives who 
are precluded from entering into a marriage or civil union due to their 
relationship by blood or adoption.175 While more than 6,000 couples 
(mostly from out-of-state) have now entered into a civil union, as of 
August 2003 no couple had yet applied to establish a reciprocal 
beneficiary relationship.176 Established in 1999, California’s “domestic 
partnership” is by far the most populous of the various registries with 
more than 23,000 registered domestic partners as of November 1, 
2003.177 As initially established, domestic partners received hospital 
visitation rights and health insurance coverage for dependents of state 
employees.178 In 2001, the list of benefits was expanded to include 
eligibility for stepparent adoptions, family and medical leave, standing to 
bring a wrongful death lawsuit, and inheritance rights, among others.179 
Even more recently, on September 19, 2003, California Governor Gray 
 
 172. HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-1 (2003); Hawaii’s Domestic Partner Law A Bust; Relatively 
Few Sign Up for Country’s Broadest Benefits Package, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 25, 1997, at A14 
(finding that only 296 couples had signed up for benefits, in contrast to the state’s estimate of 20,000 
couples). 
 173. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201 (2004). In Vermont, the adoption of civil unions did not 
come without political controversy, including a “Take Back Vermont” campaign in the fall of 2000 
that removed 20 pro-civil union legislators from office in November 2000. See Nancy Remsen, 
Statehouse Sees Shift in Power, BURLINGTON FREE PRESS, Nov. 9, 2000. 
 174. Vt. Stat. Tit. 15, § 1301 (2004). 
 175. Id. at §§ 1301, 1303. 
 176. E-mail from Richard McCoy (Aug. 25, 2003) (on file with author). 
 177. Phone call with Special Filings Section of California Secretary of State (Nov. 3, 2003) 
(reporting that of the 23,442 registered domestic partnerships, an estimated 90% have been issued to 
California residents). 
 178. 1999 Cal. Legis. Serv. 588 (West). 
 179. 2001 Cal. Legis. Serv. 893 (West). 
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Davis signed into law a bill which will make registered domestic partners 
the legal equivalent of married spouses under all provisions of state law 
when the bill takes effect on January 1, 2005.180 
The Human Rights Campaign (HRC) reports that, as of November 
2003, ten state governments extended benefits to domestic partners of 
state employees.181 Though a precise tally is difficult to obtain, at the 
local level, HRC counts approximately 166 cities and counties 
throughout the United States that offer domestic partner benefits.182 This 
number constitutes slightly less than 0.2 percent of the nation’s 87,525 
units of local government as recorded by the 2002 Census of 
Governments.183 
Reports indicate that Berkeley, California became the first American 
municipality to offer domestic partner benefits to its employees in 
1984.184 Beginning in the mid-1990’s, as additional cities and counties 
began to offer similar benefit ordinances, taxpayer challenges to these 
ordinances were filed in a number of jurisdictions. With mixed results, 
the lawsuits have commonly focused on two primary allegations: (1) that 
the policies were outside the scope of municipal authority granted by 
state law, and (2) that they infringed upon the exclusively state 
legislative authority over domestic relations law.185 
 
 180. 2003 Cal. A.B. 205. Two lawsuits have been filed in a pre-implementation challenge to 
the bill. The lawsuits allege the measure unconstitutionally contradicts the initiative statute defining 
marriage as the union of one man and one woman that was overwhelmingly approved by California 
voters on March 7, 2000. Suit Challenges Partners’ Rights Bill, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Sept. 
23, 2003, at A16. 
 181. State Governments that Offer Domestic Partner Health Benefits, Human Rights 
Campaign, available at http://www.hrc.org/worknet/dp/index.asp (including California, Connecticut, 
Iowa, Maine, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington). 
 182. Local Governments and Quasi-Governmental Agencies That Offer Domestic Partners 
Health Benefits, Human Rights Campaign, available at http://www.hrc.org/worknet/dp/index.asp (a 
search for units of local government offering domestic partner benefits turned up 166 results, 
including 83 cities and towns, 33 counties, as well as various school districts and special district 
governments). 
 183. Government Organization, at 2, Table 2, 2002 Census of Governments (Dec. 2002), 
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/gc021x1.pdf (finding 87,525 total units of local 
government, including 3,034 county governments, 19,429 municipal governments, and 16,504 town 
or township governments, in addition to 13,506 school district governments, and 35,052 special 
district governments). 
 184. See Governments Offering Benefits, Partners Task Force for Gay and Lesbian Couples, 
available at http://www.buddybuddy.com/d-p-gov.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2003). 
 185. See, e.g., Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (Minn. 
Sup. Ct. denied review) (invalidating ordinance); City of Atlanta v. McKinney, 265 Ga. 161, 454 
S.E.2d 517 (1995) (invalidating ordinance); City of Atlanta v. Morgan, 268 Ga. 586, 492 S.E.2d 193 
(1997) (affirming ordinance); Schaefer v. City & County of Denver, 973 P.2d 717 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1998) (affirming ordinance); Crawford v. City of Chicago, 304 Ill. App.3d 818, 237 Ill. Dec. 668, 
710 N.E.2d 91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (affirming ordinance); Connors v. City of Boston, 430 Mass. 31, 
714 N.E.2d 335 (Mass. 1999) (invalidating ordinance); Slattery v. City of New York, 179 Misc.2d 
740, 686 N.Y.S.2d 683 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.), aff’d as modified by 697 N.Y.S.2d 603 (1999) (affirming 
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Other questions surrounding domestic partner ordinances have arisen 
regarding the complex interplay between state and federal law. In San 
Francisco, California, the ordinance requiring city contractors to offer 
domestic partner benefits to their employees was found to be preempted 
by the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) with 
respect to ERISA-covered health and pension plans.186 In Portland, 
Maine, Catholic Charities filed suit in February 2003 making the same 
arguments against a similar ordinance recently adopted by the City of 
Portland.187 
In April 2003, a Vermont legislative committee approved legislation 
excluding civil union partners from the definition of “spouse” in statutes 
governing the state’s Medicaid system. 188 Because federal law defines 
spousal eligibility for Medicaid coverage in terms of marriage between a 
man and a woman,189 the legislators expressed concern that Vermont law 
recognizing civil union partners as “spouses” could jeopardize the state’s 
federal Medicaid funding. Having received no definitive answer from 
Washington, the state ultimately elected to rely exclusively on state 
funding to cover Medicaid premiums for same-sex couples related by 
civil union, rather than risk reliance on federal dollars which might 
jeopardize the entire program.190 
2. Benefits Litigation 
For several years, litigation has produced an increasingly pronounced 
rhetorical separation between marital status and marital benefits, as 
 
ordinance); Lowe v. Broward County, 766 So.2d 1199 (Fla. App. 4th Dist. 2000) (Fla. Sup. Ct. 
denied review) (affirming ordinance); Arlington County v. White, 259 Va. 708, 528 S.E.2d 706 
(2000) (invalidating ordinance); Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming 
ordinance); S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461 (9th Cir. 2001); 
Heinsma v. City of Vancouver, 29 P.3d 709 (Wash. 2001); Pritchard v. Madison Metro. Sch. Dist., 
242 Wis. 2d 301, 625 N.W.2d 613 (2001) (affirming ordinance); Tyma v. Montgomery County, 801 
A.2d 148 (Md. 2002) (affirming ordinance); Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 809 A.2d 980 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct., 2002) (invalidating ordinance). 
 186. Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. City & County of San Francisco, 992 F. Supp. 1149, 1155 
(N.D. Cal. 1998). 
 187. Tess Nacelewicz, Catholic Charities Sues City on Domestic Partner Issue, PORTLAND 
PRESS HERALD, Mar. 1, 2003, at 1A. 
 188. Associated Press, Vt. Panel’s New Medicaid Rules Said to Violate Civil Unions Law, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 19, 2003, at B2; David Mace, Critics Say Rule Change Violates Civil Unions, 
TIMES ARGUS, Apr. 17, 2003. 
 189. 1 U.S.C. §7. (“In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, 
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, 
the word “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and 
wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.” 
Pub. L. 104-199, sec 1, 100 Stat. 2419 (Sep. 21, 1996)). 
 190. Darren M. Allen, Administration Shifts Civil Union Medicaid Stance, TIMES ARGUS, July 
11, 2003. 
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various plaintiffs have argued that they are constitutionally entitled to 
marital benefits, while stopping short of claims for legal recognition of a 
same-sex “marriage.” Until 1998, these claims were uniformly 
unsuccessful.191 
a. Hawaii and Alaska - wrapping up Baehr and Brause. Though earlier 
benefits cases had been litigated, the distinction between marital status 
and marital benefits may have been first highlighted in Alaska and 
Hawaii after the adoption of the marriage amendments to their respective 
state constitutions. In both Alaska and Hawaii, after constitutional 
amendments effectively precluded their campaign for full legal 
recognition of same-sex “marriage,” the plaintiffs or their amici 
alternatively argued that principles of equality demanded same-sex 
couples be accorded the rights and benefits of marriage, even if marital 
status itself were to describe only opposite-sex couples.192 Both courts 
sidestepped the question, however. The Alaska Supreme Court dismissed 
the case on procedural grounds, determining that the plaintiffs had failed 
to present an actual controversy,193 and the Hawaii Supreme Court only 
hinted at a response to the arguments made by the ACLU in an amicus 
brief, stating: “The plaintiffs seek a limited scope of relief in the present 
lawsuit, i.e., access to applications for marriage licenses and the 
consequent legally recognized marital status. Inasmuch as HRS § 572-1 
is now a valid statute, the relief sought by plaintiffs is unavailable.”194 
b. Oregon Court of Appeals - Tanner v. OHSU. In 1998, the Oregon 
Court of Appeals became the first American court to find that an 
 
 191. Bailey v. City of Austin, 972 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998); Hinman v. Dep’t. of 
Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Cal. App. 3d Dist. 1985) (holding state’s denial of spousal 
dental insurance coverage to unmarried same-sex partners of state employees not unconstitutional); 
Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm’n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding state 
policy limiting employee dependent health insurance benefits to spouses and dependent children not 
unconstitutional); Ross v. Denver Dep’t of Health & Hosps., 883 P.2d 516 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994) 
(rejecting equal protection and due process challenge to denial of health insurance coverage for 
same-sex partner of employee); Rutgers Council v. Rutgers, 689 A.2d 828 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1997), cert. denied, 707 A.2d 151 (1998) (finding same-sex partner is not a “spouse” for purposes of 
health insurance law and contract); Alaska Civil Liberties Union v. Alaska, No. S-10459 (Alaska 
[date]). 
 192. Brause v. State, Dept. of Health & Social Services, 21 P.3d 357 (Alaska 2001); AkCLU 
v. Alaska, No. S-10459 (Alaska Oct. 27, 1999) (case filed on behalf of eight same-sex couples 
seeking a constitutional right to spousal employee benefits); Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394-05 (Dec. 
9, 1999). 
 193. Brause v. State, Dept. of Health & Social Services, 21 P.3d 357, 358 (Alaska 2001). 
 194. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394-05 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999). David O. Coolidge has noted that 
this suggestive language raises more questions than it answers with respect to marital benefits. The 
Hawai’i Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning, and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19, 111 (2000). 
Particularly, if marriage licenses are a narrow pursuit resulting in marital status, what is the broader 
claim that the court may be anticipating?  Id. Does it involve marital benefits as separated from 
marital status? Id. The Court left these questions unclear. Id. 
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unmarried couple had a constitutional right to marital benefits.195 In 
Tanner, three lesbian employees of the Oregon Health Sciences 
University applied for medical and dental insurance benefits on behalf of 
their same-sex partners, affirming that they would have married their 
partners were they permitted to do so under state law.196 In the summer 
of 1996, the trial court found that the denial of benefits violated both an 
employment discrimination statute197 and a constitutional provision 
guaranteeing equal privileges and immunities to all classes of citizens.198 
Moreover, the trial court attempted to define a “domestic partner” who 
would be entitled to marital benefits. The court’s rather unwieldy 
definition held that domestic partners would include “homosexual 
persons not related by blood closer than first cousins who are not legally 
married, who have continuously lived together in an exclusive and loving 
relationship that they intend to maintain for the rest of their lives, who 
have joint financial accounts and joint financial responsibilities, who 
would be married to each other if Oregon law permitted it, who have no 
other domestic partners, and who are 18 years of age or older.”199 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals ultimately found no statutory 
violation, but declared that same-sex couples constituted a suspect class 
for purposes of the constitutional analysis under Article I, section 20 of 
the Oregon Constitution.200 Having described same-sex couples as a 
suspect class, the court also applied a disparate impact analysis, declaring 
it irrelevant that the University had no intent to discriminate against 
same-sex couples.201 In the final paragraphs of its opinion, the court 
described the disparity: “Homosexual couples may not marry. 
Accordingly, the benefits are not made available on equal terms. They 
are made available on terms that, for gay and lesbian couples, are a legal 
impossibility.”202 When the defendant university showed no interest in 
appealing the decision, State Representative Ron Sunseri took the 
 
 195. Tanner v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). See also William C. 
Duncan and David O. Coolidge, Marriage and Democracy in Oregon: The Meaning and 
Implications of Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 503, 518-20 
(2000). 
 196. Tanner at 438. 
 197. OR. REV. ST. § 695.030(1)(b) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of the sex of one 
“with whom the individual associates,” which the court interpreted as a de facto prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). 
 198. OR. CONST. art. I, § 20 (“No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of 
citizens privileges or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all 
citizens.”); Tanner at 438-39. 
 199. Tanner at 439. 
 200. Id. at 447. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 448. 
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unusual step of seeking a writ of mandamus requiring the Court of 
Appeals to vacate its opinion.203 The Oregon Supreme Court refused to 
consider the case.204 
The Tanner ruling was narrow, applicable only to spousal benefits 
for state university employees.205 Nonetheless, the analysis was a 
precursor of that which would appear a year later in the Vermont 
Supreme Court’s decision in Baker v. State.206 While Tanner went 
virtually unnoticed outside of a few legal circles, Baker would set the 
state into political turmoil. 
c. Vermont - Baker v. State. Although the Baker court explicitly 
rejected the suspect class analysis adopted in Tanner,207 the basic 
substance of the Baker opinion finds commonality with much of the 
Tanner opinion. In Baker, the Court observed that “the marriage statutes 
apply expressly to opposite-sex couples. Thus, the statutes exclude 
anyone who wishes to marry someone of the same sex.”208 After reciting 
a list of the governmental benefits that are tied to marriage, the Court 
stated, “While other statutes could be added to this list, the point is clear. 
The legal benefits and protections flowing from a marriage license are of 
such significance that any statutory exclusion must necessarily be 
grounded on public concerns of sufficient weight, cogency, and authority 
that the justice of the deprivation cannot seriously be questioned.”209 
Once having reviewed the various interests put forward by the state 
in defense of the marriage statute, the Court concluded that “none of the 
interests asserted by the State provides a reasonable and just basis for the 
continued exclusion of same-sex couples from the benefits incident to a 
civil marriage license under Vermont law. Accordingly, in the faith that a 
case beyond the imagining of the framers of our Constitution may, 
nevertheless, be safely anchored in the values that infused it, we find a 
constitutional obligation to extend to plaintiffs the common benefit, 
protection, and security that Vermont law provides opposite-sex married 
couples.”210 
 
 203. Rep. Sunseri had argued that as a state legislator, his performance of his duties would be 
impacted by the decision, and that the court could be required to vacate an incorrect ruling. For 
additional information, see William C. Duncan and David O. Coolidge, Marriage and Democracy in 
Oregon: The Meaning and Implications of Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University, 36 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 503, 518-20 (2000). 
 204. Order Denying Petition for Writ of Mandamus, Sunseri v. Court of Appeals (Or. Mar. 15, 
1999) (No. S46055). 
 205. Tanner v. Or. Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d at 437. 
 206. Id. at 445-47. 
 207. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 878 n.10 (Vt. 1999). 
 208. Id. at 880. 
 209. Id. at 884. 
 210. Id. at 886. 
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It was in the Baker court’s articulation of remedy that it became 
startlingly clear that the Vermont Supreme Court had turned a marriage 
controversy into a question of benefits. 
Although plaintiffs sought injunctive and declaratory relief designed to 
secure a marriage license, their claims and arguments here have 
focused primarily upon the consequences of official exclusion from the 
statutory benefits, protections, and security incident to marriage under 
Vermont law. While some future case may attempt to establish that—
notwithstanding equal benefits and protections under Vermont law—
the denial of a marriage license operates per se to deny constitutionally-
protected rights, that is not the claim we address today. 
We hold only that plaintiffs are entitled under Chapter I, Article 7, of 
the Vermont Constitution to obtain the same benefits and protections 
afforded by Vermont law to married opposite-sex couples. We do not 
purport to infringe upon the prerogatives of the Legislature to craft an 
appropriate means of addressing this constitutional mandate, other than 
to note that the record here refers to a number of potentially 
constitutional statutory schemes from other jurisdictions. These include 
what are typically referred to as “domestic partnership” or “registered 
partnership” acts, which generally establish an alternative legal status 
to marriage for same-sex couples, impose similar formal requirements 
and limitations, create a parallel licensing or registration scheme, and 
extend all or most of the same rights and obligations provided by the 
law to married partners. 211 
The Baker court thus left the legislature with four options: (1) 
propose a constitutional amendment which would effectively reverse the 
Baker decision; (2) simply ignore the Court’s directive, likely resulting 
in judicially imposed same-sex “marriage”; (3) adopt some parallel 
system of spousal recognition for same-sex couples; or (4) include same-
sex couples within the existing statutory system governing marriage. 
Faced with these options, a number of legislators unsuccessfully pursued 
the first route, and the proposed constitutional amendment was 
eventually defeated 17-13 in the Vermont Senate.212 Others favored full 
recognition of same-sex “marriage,” an idea that proved politically 
untenable.213 Cowed by the court’s authority, and also by the prospect of 
the court’s retained jurisdiction over the case, the Legislature eventually 
 
 211. Id. 
 212. David O. Coolidge and William C. Duncan, Beyond Baker: The Case for a Vermont 
Marriage Amendment, 25 VT. L. REV. 61, 77 (2000) (citing Journal of the Senate, Proposal 6, 65th 
Gen. Assem. Bienn. Sess. (Vt.) (Apr. 18, 2000), at 2, available at http:// 
www.leg.state.vt.us/docs/2000/journals/sj000418.htm.). 
 213. Id. at 74 (same-sex “marriage” legislation was defeated by a 125-22 margin, providing 
political cover for many who eventually supported the civil unions legislation). 
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approved a system of “civil unions,” over the strong objections of a 
sizeable minority.214 
There remain differences of opinion regarding the extent to which 
Baker is properly classified as a benefits case, or whether it belongs in 
the list of marriage litigation. For my purposes, I have included Baker on 
both lists, having been filed as a marriage case and decided as a benefits 
case. On its face, Justice Amestoy’s majority opinion goes out of its way 
to remind the parties that the decision is not about the right to legal 
recognition of same-sex marriage, but only about providing benefits for 
same-sex couples.215 In reserving judgment on the question of marriage 
licenses, it can be argued that the Baker court left open the possibility 
that marriage, as an independent social institution, may represent 
something greater than the accumulation of legal benefits attached to it. 
Other commentators, however, have argued that the Baker decision itself 
is in fact a reductionist redefinition of marriage, making marriage into 
nothing more than a policy device by which to achieve certain social 
ends and upon which to confer certain legal benefits.216 This alone, the 
argument would continue, is a striking redefinition of marriage, perhaps 
necessary to the inclusion of same-sex couples, though not in itself 
requiring such inclusion. 
In Tanner, the Oregon Court of Appeals became the first court to 
constitutionally compel the extension of marital benefits to unmarried 
same-sex couples. The Baker court took this reasoning and extended it in 
an expansive ruling that applied to all marital benefits and 
responsibilities available under state law. Begun as a challenge the 
definition of marriage in Vermont and concluded as a dispute over 
spousal benefits, Baker uniquely demonstrates the close doctrinal 
relationship between marriage and benefits litigation. 
d. New York – Levin v. Yeshiva. Additional cases have brought 
marital benefits litigation to other states. In Levin v. Yeshiva 
University,217 two female Yeshiva University students challenged a 
university policy which established priority for married couples in 
applications for certain student apartments maintained by the 
university.218 The complaint alleged (1) that the married student housing 
policy discriminated against unmarried students on the basis of their 
marital status in contravention of state law and municipal code, and (2) 
 
 214. The civil unions bill ultimately passed the Vermont House by a 76-69 margin, and was 
approved in the Senate on a 19-11 vote. Id. at 74, 78. 
 215. Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 886. 
 216. See Coolidge and  Duncan, supra note 212, at 61-67. 
 217. 754 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. 2001). 
 218. Id. at 1101. 
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that the policy had a disparate discriminatory impact against gay and 
lesbian students in violation of New York City Code.219 
The trial court and Appellate Division both rejected the disparate 
impact claims, finding that the policy “had the same impact on non-
married, heterosexual medical students as it had on non-married 
homosexual medical students.”220 On further appeal, after briefly 
disposing of the marital status claim, the New York Court of Appeals 
applied a similar disparate impact analysis as was applied by the Oregon 
Court of Appeals in Tanner, remanding the case to the trial court for a 
factual determination of “whether [the University’s] housing policy has a 
disparate impact that falls along the impermissible lines of sexual 
orientation.”221 Moreover, the Court rejected the Appellate Division’s 
reasoning, which found an equal impact upon unmarried opposite-sex 
couples and unmarried same-sex couples.222 
e. Recent benefits cases. More recently, cases filed in Indiana and 
Montana have sought to replicate Tanner in other states. In Indiana, a 
state employee applied for bereavement leave upon the death of her 
lesbian partner’s father.223 The funeral leave policy provided three days 
of paid leave upon the death of certain extended family members, 
including relatives by marriage, thus creating certain benefits available 
only to married persons.224 Claiming that the policy was discriminatory 
as applied to gay and lesbian persons, the complaint alleged a violation 
of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Indiana Constitution.225 
The trial court concluded that the benefit statute did not discriminate 
on the basis of sexual orientation, but rather distinguished between 
classes of married and unmarried individuals.226 The court then adopted 
the state’s argument, inter alia, that the marriage-based bereavement 
leave policy was reasonable insofar as it provided an objective and easily 
identifiable standard upon which to base employee benefits, relying on 
the longstanding legal structure of marriage.227 On appeal, the court took 
a more skeptical approach, summarily rejecting the state’s proffered 
justifications for the policy and declaring simply, “[T]he policy exists to 
 
 219. Id. 
 220. Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 709 N.Y.S.2d 392, 393 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000), rev’d on appeal 
754 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. 2001). 
 221. Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 754 N.E.2d at 1106. 
 222. Id. at 1105-06. 
 223. Cornell v. Hamilton, 791 N.E.2d 214, 215 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
 224. Id. at 219. 
 225. Id. at 215. 
 226. Cornell v. Hamilton, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Entry of Summary 
Judgment, 49D04 0002 CP 180 (Ind. Marion Super. Ct., July 15, 2002), aff’d on appeal, 791 N.E.2d 
214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003). 
 227. Id. 
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strengthen family relationships, and families are different today than they 
once were.”228 Nonetheless, the court found that the plaintiff had 
conceded a rational connection between marriage and the bereavement 
policy, arguing only that it was discriminatory as applied to same-sex 
couples. This framing of the question deprived the court of the 
opportunity to decide “the close question of whether, in this age of 
changing family relationships, the policy’s distinction based on marital 
status is rational.”229 Finding no allegation that the marriage-based policy 
had been applied in a discriminatory fashion against gay and lesbian 
persons, the court upheld the constitutionality of the policy.230 
Finally, in a case still pending before the Montana Supreme Court, 
two University of Montana employees filed suit alleging that they had 
been unconstitutionally denied the opportunity to obtain spousal benefits 
for their unmarried partners.231 
C. Interstate Marriage Recognition Questions 
The adoption of civil unions legislation in Vermont gave practical 
significance to the theoretical questions regarding interstate marriage 
recognition widely discussed during the Baehr litigation in Hawaii. In 
making Vermont the first American state to recognize same-sex partners 
as “spouses” with all the rights, benefits and responsibilities of married 
couples,232 the civil unions legislation raised real and immediate 
questions regarding the legal status of couples who traveled to Vermont, 
entered into a civil union, and then returned home to Boston, Boise, or 
Birmingham. Like marriage, the civil union law contains no residency 
requirement for applicants, and within a year, same-sex couples from 
each of the 50 states had obtained civil union licenses in Vermont.233 
After the first year, more than 75 percent of the more than two thousand 
civil union licenses issued by the state of Vermont had been granted to 
non-residents.234 As of August 1, 2003, more than 85 percent of the 5914 
 
 228. Cornell v. Hamilton, 791 N.E.2d 214, 219 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (noting that same-sex 
couples can participate in childrearing). 
 229. Id. at 219. 
 230. Id. at 220. 
 231. Snetsinger v. Bd. of Regents, No. 03-238. 
 232. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1204(b) (2004) (“A party to a civil union shall be included in 
any definition or use of the terms “spouse,” “family,” “immediate family,” “dependent,” “next of 
kin,” and other terms that denote the spousal relationship, as those terms are used throughout the 
law.”). 
 233. State of Vermont 2001 Vital Statistics at I-1, Vermont Department of Health (2001 Civil 
Unions: Place of Residence of Party A and Party B), available at: 
http://www.healthyvermonters.info/hs/vital/2001/i01.htm. 
 234. Elizabeth Mehren, Gay Couples Do “Wedding” March to Vt., L.A. TIMES, July 8, 2001, 
at A1. See also Civil Union Statistics, MarriageWatch.org, available at 
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civil union licenses granted by the Vermont Bureau of Vital Statistics 
had been issued to non-Vermonters.235 After rising steadily for a time, 
the ratio of new licenses granted to out-of-state residents appears to have 
leveled off at around 90 percent.236 These recent statistics indicate that 
there are now more than 5,000 couples from all across the nation with 
civil union certificates, questioning whether those certificates will be 
recognized by their home state.237 
1. Principles of interstate marriage recognition238 
Though filled with complex questions that may arise,239 the general 
principles of interstate marriage recognition are relatively settled. While 
courts virtually always recognize marriages performed in other states or 
nations, 240 it has long been understood that they are under no 
 
http://www.marriagewatch.org/media/cudata.htm (as of July 1, 2001, there had been 2258 civil 
union licenses issued, including 1795 to out-of-state couples, and 463 to Vermont residents.). 
 235. E-mail from Bill Apao, Vermont Department of Health (Aug. 8, 2003) (on file with 
author) (5914 civil unions, including 859 to Vermont residents); Fred A. Bernstein, Gay Unions 
Were Only Half the Battle, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2003, at s.9 p.2 (reporting that 85% of civil union 
licenses had been issued to out-of-state couples in April 2003). 
 236. In 2000, 78% of civil unions were issued to out-of-state couples, while that number 
jumped to nearly 87% in 2001. See 2001 Summary of Vermont Civil Unions, Vermont Department of 
Health, available at http://www.healthyvermonters.info/hs/vital/2001/cu.shtml. Though official 2002 
data is not yet available, civil union data from February 1, 2002 and August 1, 2003 indicates that 
90.2% (2130) of the 2361 civil unions issued during that period went to non-Vermonters. See Civil 
Union Statistics, MarriageWatch.org, available at http://www.marriagewatch.org/media/cudata.htm. 
Coupled with U.S. Census 2000 data showing 1,933 same-sex couples in Vermont, these numbers 
suggest that approximately 24% of same-sex couples in Vermont entered into civil unions law 
during the first year the law was in effect. By August 2003, that ratio jumped to 44%, though the 
census data does not account for same-sex couples who may have relocated to Vermont since 2000. 
Tavia Simmons and Martin O’Connell, Married Couple and Unmarried Partner Households: 2000, 
Table 2, at 4, U.S. Census Bureau (Feb. 2003). 
 237. See Bernstein, supra note 235. 
 238. Others with expertise in the area of conflicts of laws have ably set forth the relevant 
principles in other articles. As one without particular expertise in this area, my purpose here is 
simply to articulate the general principles and highlight areas raising more specific questions. See, 
e.g., Ralph U. Whitten, Exporting and Importing Domestic Partnerships: Some Conflict-of-Laws 
Questions and Concerns, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1235 (2001); Richard Myers, Same-Sex ‘Marriage’ 
and the Public Policy Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 45, 47 (1998); see also Patrick L. Borchers, 
Baker v. General Motors Corp.: Implications for Interjurisdictional Recognition of Non-Traditional 
Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147 (1998). 
 239. For example, questions concerning interstate recognition of divorce decrees, adoptions, 
or other legal judgments that may be dependent upon or incident to a marriage valid in one state. 
 240. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 63 (“a marriage which is valid under the law of the state or 
country in which it is contracted will generally be recognized as valid”); see also Donlann v. 
Macgurn, 55 P.3d 74, 77 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002) (“Unless strong public policy exceptions require 
otherwise, the validity of the marriage is generally determined by the law of the place of marriage.”); 
Hudson Trail Outfitters v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Empl. Servs., 801 A.2d 987, 989 (D.C. 
2002) (“[A] marriage’s validity is to be determined by the law of the state where the marriage took 
place, unless the result would contradict or offend public policy.”); Xiong ex rel. Edmondson v. 
Xiong, 648 N.W. 2d 900, 903 (Wis. Ct. App. 2002) (“Marriages valid where celebrated are valid 
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compulsion to do so when a particular marriage would contradict a 
state’s public policy. 241 As Professor Richard Myers noted in 1998 
regarding the hypothetical case of a couple from one of the contiguous 
48 states (or Alaska) who might travel to Hawaii to obtain a marriage 
license, “The answer to this question ought to be quite easy: the home 
state is not required to recognize such a union by either normal conflicts 
doctrine or by the Constitution, and in fact there are very legitimate 
reasons that the home state might well invoke to refuse to recognize such 
a union.”242 Thus, if a marriage valid in Vermont is deemed contrary to 
the public policy of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania need not recognize the 
marriage. 
Historically, marriage laws in the United States have been marked by 
a general uniformity and only minor differentiation, giving courts many 
opportunities to recite the public policy doctrine and few opportunities to 
apply it. The occasional conflicts that have arisen usually involve issues 
such as marriageable age,243 first cousin marriages,244 and common law 
marriages.245 In each of these cases, courts have in most cases recognized 
the foreign marriage if valid where contracted, even where not permitted 
 
everywhere, except those contrary to the law of nature and those which the law has declared invalid 
upon the ground of public policy,” quoting In re Estate of Campbell, 51 N.W.2d 709 (Wis. 1952)); 
People v. Schmidt, 579 N.W.2d 431, 434 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (“Michigan follows the general rule 
that ‘a marriage valid where it is contracted is valid everywhere.’” (citations omitted)); Bogardi v. 
Bogardi, 542 N.W.2d 417 (Neb. 1996) (“The general rule is that the validity of a marriage is 
determined by the law of the place where it was contracted; if valid there, it will be held valid 
everywhere, and conversely, if invalid by the lex loci contractus, it will be invalid wherever the 
question may arise.”). 
 241. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 64 (“The general rule that a state will recognize as valid a 
marriage that was valid in the state in which it was contracted is subject to an exception where 
recognition in the forum state would be contrary to the public policy of that state.”). 
 242. Richard Myers, Same-Sex ‘Marriage’ and the Public Policy Doctrine, 32 CREIGHTON L. 
REV. 45, 47 (1998); see also Patrick L. Borchers, Baker v. General Motors Corp.: Implications for 
Interjurisdictional Recognition of Non-Traditional Marriages, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 147 (1998); 
Judicial Activism vs. Democracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights 
and Property Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong., Mar. 3, 2004 (written 
statement of Prof. Lea Brilmayer, Howard M. Holtzmann Professor of International Law, Yale Law 
School). 
 243. See, e.g., State v. Graves, 307 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1957) (recognizing validity of 
Mississippi marriage of 13-year-old girl even though not permitted under Arkansas law); Wilkins v. 
Zelichowski, 140 A.2d 65 (N.J. 1958) (declining to recognize an underage marriage of New Jersey 
residents which was valid in Indiana, the state in which it was solemnized); Keith v. Pack, 187 
S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. 1945) (recognizing underage marriage of Tennessee residents which was valid in 
Georgia, the state in which it was solemnized). 
 244. See, e.g., Mason v. Mason, 775 N.E.2d 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (recognizing validity of 
Tennessee marriage between first cousins, even though not permitted under Indiana law). 
 245. See, e.g., Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1961) (declining to 
recognize a common law marriage entered into in the District of Columbia by New Jersey residents); 
People v. Schmidt, 579 N.W.2d 431, 466 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (recognizing common law marriage 
entered into in Alabama). 
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under the laws of the receiving state.246 Marriages from other nations are 
also generally granted recognition, though courts have on various 
occasions refused to recognize bigamous or incestuous marriages as 
contrary to state public policy.247 
For purposes of this choice of law question, courts are not strictly 
bound by a Full Faith & Credit analysis under Article IV of the 
Constitution.248 In 1998, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed this 
distinction between choice of laws and interstate recognition of 
judgments in Baker v. General Motors Corp., explaining: 
Our precedent differentiates the credit owed to laws (legislative 
measures and common law) and to judgments. “In numerous cases this 
Court has held that credit must be given to the judgment of another 
state although the forum would not be required to entertain the suit on 
which the judgment was founded.” The Full Faith and Credit Clause 
does not compel “a state to substitute the statutes of other states for its 
own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which it is 
competent to legislate.. . . A court may be guided by the forum State’s 
“public policy” in determining the law applicable to a controversy.249 
This public policy doctrine is embodied in both Restatements on 
Conflicts of Laws. Under the First Restatement, a marriage contrary to 
the public policy of either party’s home state was invalid in the cases of 
polygamous marriages, incestuous marriages, certain interracial 
marriages, and other marriages explicitly denied recognition by statutory 
enactment.250 The Second Restatement, published in 1971, modifies the 
First Restatement’s rule by deleting reference to specific marriages held 
invalid and replacing it with a more general choice of law statement 
based on a state’s relationship to the parties and the marriage: 
(1) The validity of a marriage will be determined by the local law of the 
state which, with respect to the particular issue, has the most significant 
 
 246. The most common exception to this practice arises where the case involves residents of 
the state who left the state in order to circumvent the state’s marriage laws. See, e.g., Metropolitan 
Life Ins. Co. v. Chase, 294 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1961). 
 247. See, e.g., People v. Ezeonu, 588 N.Y.S. 2d 116 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1992) (declining to 
recognize a second Nigerian marriage as a defense to a charge of rape); Catalano v. Catalano, 170 
A.2d 726 (Conn. 1961) (declining to recognize Italian marriage between Connecticut resident and 
his Italian niece). 
 248. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 62 (“Such effect as may be given by one state to the marriage 
laws of another state is merely because of comity, or because public policy and justice demand the 
recognition of such laws, and no state is bound by comity to give effect in its courts to laws which 
are repugnant to its own laws and policy.”). 
 249. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 663-64 (1998) (quoting Milwaukee County 
v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 
U.S. 493, 501 (1939)). 
 250. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 132 (1934). 
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relationship to the spouses and the marriage under the principles stated 
in § 6.251 
(2) A marriage which satisfies the requirements of the state where the 
marriage was contracted will everywhere be recognized as valid unless 
it violates the strong public policy of another state which had the most 
significant relationship to the spouses and the marriage at the time of 
the marriage.252 
Exercising its authority under the Full Faith & Credit provision of 
the United States Constitution,253 Congress in 1996 adopted the Defense 
of Marriage Act, which, in part, provides that no state shall be compelled 
to recognize a “marriage” between persons of the same sex, even if that 
marriage was lawful in the state in which it was contracted.254 
In reliance upon this authority, 38 states have adopted statutory or 
constitutional provisions barring recognition of foreign marriages 
between persons of the same sex.255 The first of these was adopted in 
Hawaii in 1994 in an unsuccessful attempt to head off the Baehr 
marriage litigation.256 Utah followed in 1995 out of concern that Hawaii 
would soon recognize same-sex “marriages.”257 Fifteen additional states 
adopted marriage recognition (mini-DOMA) laws in 1996,258 with 9 
more states following their lead in 1997.259 By the end of 1998, a total of 
30 states had adopted affirmative policies denying recognition of same-
 
 251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 6 (1971) (stating that a court will 
first “follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law,” and where there is no applicable 
statute, setting forth seven factors to be considered in determining choice of law). 
 252. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAW § 283. 
 253. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1. 
 254. Pub. L. 104-199 sec. 2, 100 Stat. 2419 (Sep. 21, 1996) codified at 28 U.S.C. §1738C 
(1997). 
 255. Supra note 20. 
 256. 1994 Haw. Sess. Laws 217. See David O. Coolidge & William C. Duncan, State 
Marriage Recognition Statutes, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1, 6 (1998). 
 257. UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2 (1995); Utah Code Ann. § 30-1-4 (Supp. 1998). 
 258. ALASKA STAT. § 25.05.013 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-101 (1991); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 101 (1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-30 (1996); IDAHO CODE § 32-209 (Michie 
1996); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/212 (West 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-101 (1996); H.B. 
5662 (Mich. 1996); S.B. 937 (Mich. 1995); MO. REV. STAT. § 451.022 (1997); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 
51.1.2 (1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43-3, 43-3.1 (1996); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1704 (West 
Supp. 1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-10 (Supp. 1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 20-1-15 (Supp. 1997); 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie 1992); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-3-113 (1996). 
 259. H.B. 1004, 81st G.A. (Ark. 1997); S.B. 5, 81st G.A. (Ark. 1997); H.B. 147 (Fla. 1997); 
House Enrolled Act 1265, 110th G.A. (Ind. 1997); Laws 65, 118th Leg. (Me. 1997); S.F. 830 (Minn. 
1997); S.B. 2053 (Miss. 1997); H.B. 323 (Mont. 1997); S.B. 2230, 55th Leg. (S.D. 1997); Acts 365 
(Va. 1997). 
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sex “marriage.”260 In the five years since then, eight additional states 
have adopted marriage recognition statutes.261 
2. Marriage recognition litigation 
To date, there have been only two direct challenges to defense of 
marriage legislation at the state or federal levels. The first case, the only 
reported challenge to the federal Defense of Marriage Act, arose in the 
Seventh Circuit, when Robert Mueller on two occasions attempt to file a 
joint tax return with his partner, Todd Bates, arguing that the Defense of 
Marriage Act unconstitutionally refused to recognize his same-sex 
marriage. In the first case, Mueller’s DOMA challenge was dismissed 
because the Defense of Marriage Act was not in effect for the tax years 
in question. When the case returned to the Seventh Circuit for subsequent 
tax years, the court dismissed the case for lack of standing, finding that 
no state had licensed the purported same-sex “marriage,” and it is 
impossible to recognize a marriage license that has not been granted.262 
The second challenge comes in the form of a lawsuit filed on April 
30, 2003 against the state of Nebraska, alleging that the Nebraska 
marriage amendment violates the federal constitutional guarantee of 
equal protection and constitutes an unconstitutional bill of attainder.263 
Rather than directly challenge the same-sex marriage ban, the lawsuit 
focuses on the second sentence of the amendment, which prohibits 
recognition of any same-sex civil union or domestic partnership, arguing 
that the amendment erects a higher bar to recognition of same-sex 
domestic partnerships than would be required to enact opposite-sex 
domestic partnerships.264 Lambda Legal and the ACLU on behalf of 
 
 260. H.B. 152 (Ala. 1998); H.F. 382 (Iowa 1998); H.B. 13 (Ky. 1998); H.B. 1130, 55th Leg. 
(Wash. 1997). 
 261. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (Proposition 22, approved Mar. 7, 2000); NEB. CONST. art. I, § 
29 (Initiative Measure 416, approved Nov. 7, 2000); Nev. Question 2 (approved Nov. 5, 2002); TEX. 
FAM. CODE ANN. § 6.204 (Acts 2003, 78th Leg., ch. 124, § 1, eff. Sept. 1, 2003); MO. REV. STAT. § 
451.022 (L.2001, H.B. 157, § A) (reenacted after being stricken on procedural grounds); 2004 Ohio 
Laws 61 (H.B. 272); W.VA. CODE § 48-2-603 (Acts 2001, c.91, eff. Sept. 1, 2001); S.D. CODIFIED. 
LAWS § 25-1-1 (Michie 2003); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-2-104 (Laws 2000, Ch. 233, § 1, eff. May 
26, 2000). 
 262. Mueller v. C.I.R., 2002 WL 1401297 (not selected for publication in the Federal 
Reporter) (also warning Mr. Mueller that “if he continues to file frivolous tax appeals, he faces the 
possibility of sanctions”). 
 263. Complaint, Citizens for Equal Protection v. Att’y Gen., 290 F.Supp.2d 1004 (D. Neb 
2003) (No. 4:03CV3155). 
 264. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29 (“The uniting of two persons of the same sex in a civil union, 
domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or recognized in 
Nebraska.”). 
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three Nebraska non-profit educational and advocacy organizations filed 
the case jointly.265 
On June 30, 2003, the Nebraska Attorney General’s office moved to 
dismiss the litigation, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to satisfy the 
Article III case or controversy requirements for subject matter 
jurisdiction of federal courts.266 The state also sought to dismiss the bill 
of attainder claim for failure to state a cause of action.267 Federal District 
Judge Joseph Bataillon denied the state’s motion to dismiss on 
November 10, 2003, and the case is currently pending before the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Nebraska.268 
As these two cases demonstrate, standing is a major hurdle in any 
constitutional challenge to state or federal marriage recognition (DOMA) 
provisions. Moreover, standing will remain an issue unless or until one 
or more states issues a marriage license to a same-sex couple, giving 
them a potential grievance in the event another state refuses to recognize 
their marriage. 
3. Civil union recognition cases 
In the absence of any American jurisdiction granting marriage 
licenses to persons of the same sex, there have been few grounds upon 
which to challenge the recognition provisions of the various state 
marriage statutes. The handful of cases that have arisen have done so in 
the context of Vermont civil unions.269 Though not directly a question of 
“marriage” recognition, several couples have sued to have their Vermont 
civil union certificates recognized as proof of marriage or spousal status 
in other states.270 
Because “civil unions” are not “marriages,” this litigation requires 
courts to address a two-pronged inquiry.271 The first prong of analysis 
requires some identification of a civil union – deciding whether a 
Vermont civil union is the same as a marriage. If not, a state may 
conclude that it has no structure or basis under which to recognize the 
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 269. See, e.g., Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Rosengarten v. Downes, 71 
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civil union. That is, in a state which has no system of civil unions 
(currently including all 49 of Vermont’s neighboring states),272 a court 
has three choices in dealing with the civil union: (1) recognize the civil 
union as a marriage; (2) recognize the civil union as some other 
domestic, contractual, or equitable relationship; or (3) refuse to recognize 
the civil union. If a court elects to treat a civil union as either a marriage 
or some other form of relationship, the court must then proceed to the 
second prong of analysis. Under the second prong, the court must 
determine whether the civil union is entitled to recognition under either 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution or 
under common law principles of comity. 
To date, three reported opinions (two intermediate appellate opinions 
and one trial court ruling) have addressed these questions,273 while court 
documents and newspaper reports identify several additional cases that 
have not led to a published opinion.274 In each of the published cases, the 
court has recognized that it is not automatically required to recognize a 
civil union, but that it must undertake an analysis of state public policy to 
determine whether the union is consistent with the policy of the 
jurisdiction. 
The first of these cases, Burns v. Burns, arose in the context of a 
child custody consent decree in which the divorced Darian and Susan 
Burns had agreed that neither spouse would have an overnight adult 
guest in the home while the children were present, unless the parent and 
the third party were “legally married” or closely related.275 In July 2000, 
Susan Burns and her lesbian partner, Debra Freer, traveled to Vermont 
where they obtained a civil union license and subsequently returned to 
their home in Georgia.276 Following their civil union, Susan and Debra 
deemed themselves married for purposes of the consent decree, and two 
months later Darian Burns filed a motion for contempt, alleging violation 
of the consent decree.277 The trial judge ruled that Susan Burns was in 
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 273. Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002); Rosengarten v. Downes, 71 Conn. 
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 275. Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d at 48. 
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violation of the consent decree, though declining to hold her in contempt. 
On appeal, Susan argued that she and her partner were married in 
Vermont, and that their Vermont “marriage” was entitled to full faith and 
credit in Georgia.278 Additionally, they argued that the Georgia 
Protection of Marriage Act violated federal constitutional guarantees as 
well as a right to privacy under the state constitution.279 
Among the various groups filing amicus curiae briefs in the case 
were two groups of legislators. A group of 69 Vermont legislators filed a 
brief in support of the father, explaining that even under Vermont law, a 
civil union and a marriage are distinct legal entities,280 while a group of 
Georgia legislators presented a comprehensive analysis of Georgia public 
policy with respect to same-sex unions.281 
The Georgia Court of Appeals issued its ruling on January 23, 2002, 
holding that (1) a civil union is not a marriage under Vermont law, and 
thus not entitled to recognition as a “legal marriage” under Georgia 
law;282 (2) even if the lesbian couple had obtained a “legal marriage” 
under Vermont law, same-sex marriage was contrary to the public policy 
of Georgia and statutorily denied recognition;283 and (3) the right to 
privacy under the Georgia Constitution did not require affirmative legal 
recognition of the couple’s partnership.284 
The Georgia Court of Appeals subsequently denied a motion for 
reconsideration,285 and the Georgia Supreme Court denied review of the 
case.286 
In Burns, because the underlying consent decree used the precise 
language of “legally married,” the court did not address the question of 
whether a civil union is entitled to alternative recognition as some form 
of non-marital domestic or contractual relationship. That was precisely 
the question faced by the Connecticut Court of Appeals, however, in 
 
 278. Brief for Appellant at 6, Burns v. Burns, 560 S.E.2d 47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (No. 
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Rosengarten v. Downes.287 On December 31, 2000, Glen Rosengarten, a 
Connecticut resident, and Peter Downes, a New York resident, entered 
into a Vermont civil union.288 When their relationship ended several 
months later, Peter Rosengarten sued for divorce in Connecticut Superior 
Court.289 Because Vermont law requires that at least one party be a 12-
month resident of Vermont before a divorce is granted,290 they were 
ineligible for a divorce under Vermont law and sought to dissolve their 
civil union in a Connecticut court. 
Much like the Burns court, the Connecticut Court of Appeals was 
forced to determine whether a civil union was the same as a marriage, 
and, if so, whether an out-of-state marriage between persons of the same 
sex could be recognized in Connecticut. Complicating the question 
somewhat, however, was the fact that a catchall clause in the Connecticut 
domestic relations act gave broad jurisdictional authority to the court to 
resolve other domestic relations matters not explicitly addressed in the 
statute.291 Though Connecticut does not have a marriage recognition 
statute that expressly precludes recognition of same-sex “marriages,” the 
court reached much the same result as the Georgia Court of Appeals had 
in Burns, relying heavily on a clause in the adoption code that stated that 
same-sex “marriage” was contrary to state public policy.292 
In his petition for certiorari to the Connecticut Supreme Court, 
Rosengarten argued that Connecticut policy favored recognition of a 
Vermont civil union,293 but that even if a civil union were not recognized 
as a marriage under Connecticut law, the family court still had 
jurisdiction in the case under the catchall provision giving the court 
jurisdiction over all domestic relations matters.294 On September 19, 
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2002, the Supreme Court accepted the case for review,295 weeks before 
Peter Rosengarten died after a struggle with lymphoma and HIV.296 
Following Rosengarten’s death, which legally dissolved the civil union, 
the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as moot, leaving the appellate 
decision intact.297 
The final reported opinion dealing with interstate recognition of a 
Vermont civil union comes from a New York trial court, the only court 
thus far to extend marital recognition to a Vermont civil union in a 
reported opinion.298 Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital is a wrongful death 
case in which the partner of the deceased Neal Spicehandler is seeking to 
pursue a wrongful death claim against St. Vincent’s Hospital. Without 
declaring the Vermont civil union a full equivalent of marriage for all 
cases, the trial judge found no expression of New York public policy 
opposing same-sex unions, and ruled that the Vermont civil union gave 
Spicehandler’s partner standing to sue as a spouse in the context of the 
wrongful death suit.299 This case is currently pending on appeal before 
the New York Appellate Division. 
Several additional civil union recognition cases have been filed,300 
including a West Virginia trial court that dissolved a civil union in a 
divorce proceeding. According to news reports, Marion County Family 
Court Judge David P. Born dissolved the civil union of Misty Gorman 
and Sherry Gump in a divorce judgment issued on December 22, 2002.301 
In granting the divorce, Judge Born described the situation of the two 
women as “citizens of West Virginia in need of a judicial remedy to 
dissolve a legal relationship created by the laws of another state.”302 
A second case was filed in Florida, in a situation similar to that 
addressed by the Georgia Court of Appeals in Burns v. Burns.303 When 
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Robert Hall and Traci Beauchamp divorced in 1999, their settlement 
contained a provision forbidding the presence of overnight guests other 
than “close family members” while the children were in the home.304 
Robert Hall and his same-sex partner subsequently traveled to Vermont 
where they entered into a civil union, and returned to petition the court 
for a modification of the divorce judgment. The court concluded that 
there had been no change in circumstances sufficient to justify a 
modification of the order as: (1) the former husband had voluntarily 
consented to the initial order; (2) Florida law does not recognize 
marriages between persons of the same sex; and (3) the Vermont civil 
union does not establish a “special category” rising to the level of a 
substantial change in circumstances.305 On appeal to the 1st District 
Court of Appeals in Tallahassee, the case was unanimously affirmed 
without a published opinion.306 
Another matter arose, at least briefly, in Indiana, where the plaintiffs 
in the same-sex “marriage” litigation included an alternative claim for 
recognition as spouses pursuant to their Vermont civil union license.307 
Following the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss, which argued that 
such unions were against Indiana public policy and that Indiana had no 
duty to recognize a Vermont civil union, the plaintiffs amended their 
complaint and dropped the recognition claim.308 
A fourth case arose in Texas, while the Texas Legislature was 
considering legislation that would eventually make Texas the 37th state to 
adopt marriage recognition (DOMA) legislation. On March 3, 2003, 
Beaumont Family Court Judge Tom Mulvaney granted a divorce decree 
to two Texas men who had obtained a civil union license in Vermont.309 
When news of the divorce decree hit the newspapers, Texas Attorney 
General Greg Abbott intervened, asking the judge to reconsider the 
decree. Abbott argued, “Because these two men were never married 
under either Vermont or Texas law, they cannot legally petition for 
divorce under the Texas Family Code. The court’s final decree of divorce 
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is void as a matter of law.”310 Taken aback by the sudden interest in the 
matter, the judge withdrew the divorce decree and ordered the parties to 
brief the question of whether a Texas court had jurisdiction to dissolve a 
Vermont civil union.311 Faced with the prospect of opposition from the 
Attorney General’s office, the two men withdrew their petition for the 
divorce.312 
III. CONCLUSION— THE ROAD AHEAD 
A. The Future of Marriage Litigation 
In this article, I have attempted to provide a snapshot of the marriage 
debate as it stood at the beginning of 2004. By the time this article goes 
to press, there will undoubtedly be much more that has occurred, but 
such is the nature of a snapshot. 
While the legal debate continues to intensify in courtrooms and 
legislative chambers in Washington D.C. and across the country, the 
future of the marriage debate lies in the opinion of the American public. 
A majority which favors same-sex marriage will ultimately see that 
policy reflected in the law; a sufficiently motivated majority supporting 
marriage as a means of providing children with both mothers and fathers 
will overcome even the most stubborn court judgment with constitutional 
amendments. To date, the marriage debate has been driven largely by 
elite opinion; the past six months have opened the debate to the 
American public. 
B. Dynamics of Public Opinion 
Writing in the September 11, 2001 edition of The Advocate, Evan 
Wolfson, now president of the New York-based Freedom to Marry, 
described his public relations strategy, outlining three elements of a 
campaign to win same-sex marriage. The first of Wolfson’s three 
elements acknowledges the value of strategic lawsuits and legislative 
efforts, but casts its focus on “enhanced public education and outreach 
work.” The second element of the strategy requires “development of a 
clear and sophisticated understanding of what demographics we need to 
reach in order to firm up our 30%–35% base and soften up and move the 
15%–20% of the public who are movable.” Finally, the third aspect of 
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the Wolfson plan calls for the “deployment of resources, trainings, 
messages, messengers, and vehicles to help non-gay and gay partners in 
different states and constituencies communicate transformative 
information and enlist additional non-gay support.”313 Each of these 
strategic goals is focused primarily on winning the marriage debate in the 
arena of public opinion. 
In 2001, Wolfson described a 30-35 percent base of public support 
for same-sex marriage.314 CNN and Time pollsters first asked 
respondents about “marriages between homosexual men and woman” in 
1989, finding 23% support for same-sex marriage.315 When Gallup 
conducted its first poll on same-sex “marriage” in 1996, 27 percent of 
respondents supported the legal recognition of same-sex unions, while 68 
percent of respondents opposed the proposition.316 Over the next 6 years, 
polling data continued to show a slow rise in public acceptance of same-
sex unions.317 By July 2003, 38 percent of respondents to a Pew Research 
Center poll endorsed same-sex marriage, while opposition decreased to 
53 percent. In the short term, at least, early July 2003 appears to be the 
high water mark in public support for same-sex marriage. Between July 
and November 2003, support for same-sex marriage dropped 6 
percentage points according to identical Pew Research Center polls, 
negating much of the increase of the past six years.318 Other polls have 
shown a similar reversal, with a December 2003 Gallup poll finding a 
10-point rise in opposition to same-sex marriage since June 2003, while 
support for same-sex marriage dropped to its lowest level since 1996.319 
It remains to be seen whether these recent poll results point to the 
start of a new trend or merely a short-term backlash against unpopular 
judicial decisions of 2003. Polls gauging intensity of opinion give further 
insight into the dynamics of the debate, suggesting that opinions are 
beginning to solidify, particularly among opponents of same-sex 
marriage. A Pew Research Center poll released in November 2003 shows 
35 percent of respondents “strongly opposed” to same-sex marriage, 
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compared to just 9 percent who “strongly favor” the idea. A National 
Public Radio poll from December 2003 found 48 percent of respondents 
strongly opposed to same-sex marriage, while 17 percent strongly 
favored the idea.320 
Another gauge of public opinion has come in the form of ballot 
referenda in Alaska, Hawaii, California, Nebraska, and Nevada. In each 
of these five states, voters have approved measures defining marriage as 
the union of a man and a woman by margins of more than 20 percentage 
points.321 With a cumulative turnout of 9.4 million voters over a three-
year period from 1998 through 2000, American voters in the five states 
supported these measures by a cumulative 63.1 percent to 36.9 percent 
margin.322 
These numbers represent the future of marriage in the United States. 
Ironically, a Massachusetts court’s effort to remove the marriage 
question from the realm of public debate has thrust marriage to a 
prominent place in public discourse. Though laws and judicial decisions 
will continue to play an important educational role in our culture, public 
policy is a lagging indicator of public opinion and will necessarily follow 
the consensus of the American people. The marriage debate taking place 
today is a healthy debate, informing and instructing not only individual 
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